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Abstract
The licensing of nuclear power plants has focused until now on Light Water Reactors and has not
incorporated systematically insights and benefits from Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).
With the goal of making the licensing process more efficient, predictable and stable for advanced
reactors, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has recently drafted a risk-
informed and technology-neutral framework for new plant licensing. The Commission expects
that advanced nuclear power plants will show enhanced margins of safety, and that advanced
reactor designs will comply with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement. In order to
meet these expectations, PRA tools are currently being considered; among them are frequency-
consequence (F-C) curves, which plot the frequency of having C or more consequences
(fatalities, injuries, dollars, dose...) against the consequences C. The present research analyzes
the role and the usefulness of such curves in risk-informing the licensing process in the U.S., and
shows that their use allows the implementation of both structuralist and rationalist Defense-In-
Depth. The second part of this work concentrates on F-C curves as a mean to assess and limit
societal risk. Such tools would improve the safety of current plants by allowing the regulator to
focus its attention on the plants that pose the highest societal risks in events such as power
uprates.
Thesis Supervisor: George E. Apostolakis, Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
and of Engineering Systems
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Part I. Introduction
Nuclear electricity accounts today for approximately 17 percent of worldwide electricity
generation. Once regarded as the most promising source of energy, nuclear energy has faced
major public opposition heightened by the accidents of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, which
contributed to a slowing down of the whole industry in the United States. Recently, advantages
of nuclear power have been given more light and publicity, which fosters the rebirth of nuclear
power: among them is the fact that nuclear energy does not contribute to the emission of
greenhouse gases. However, fears raised with Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents are
still vivid. The 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study on the Future of
Nuclear Power shows that safety is a key discriminating factor to be considered for the growth of
nuclear power. In order to address this issue, major changes in the safety approach, for instance
the increased use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), have been made and contribute to the
emergence of a safer fleet of reactors.
All commercial reactors in operation today belong to the Generations II and III. The U.S.
Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology has launched several
programs aimed at developing the next generation of nuclear energy systems. Part of the research
effort is focused on new reactor concepts, the Generation IV reactors, such as the Gas-Cooled
Fast Reactor (GFR), currently designed at MIT. In parallel to the design process currently
underway, regulatory authorities are moving forward to define new licensing rules for future
plants. Indeed, regulations of nuclear power plants have focused until now on Light Water
Reactors only, and have not systematically incorporated insights and benefits from PRA
methods. Part II of this work provides an overview of the current licensing process. In Part III,
the main concepts of the safety philosophy of nuclear reactors are introduced. Among them is
Defense-In-Depth, which will remain a fundamental tenet of the safety approach for advanced
reactors.
So, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has defined as a goal to risk-inform the
regulations and make the licensing process more efficient, predictable, and stable. Indeed, when
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 is used to license a design differing
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from the Light Water Reactor (LWR) design, the applicability of the regulations must be
reviewed, exemptions documented, and additional requirements justified. This case-by-case
analysis entails inefficiency. As for the predictability and stability of licensing processes, they
pertain to the timing and outcome of the case-by-case review under 10 CFR 50: without a
systematic set of rules applicable to all reactors, similar issues might be treated differently and
uncertainty on the result of the review arises. To overcome these difficulties, the USNRC has
recently drafted a technology-neutral framework for new plant licensing, which should in the
long term replace 10 CFR Part 50. An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued by
the Commission in May 2006. Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency has started
giving guidance for developing a set of requirements that would be applicable to any kind of
nuclear reactor. An objective of this research work is to analyze the use of specific risk
assessment tools known as frequency-consequence (F-C) curves in future reactor licensing. Part
IV presents a discussion of frequency-consequence curves in future reactor licensing and shows
how such tool allows a risk-informed licensing process.
The question of including societal risk in the regulations has been regularly raised and it is
legitimate in the context of the new framework to ask if societal risk should be included in the
new licensing approach, and how F-C curves could contribute to societal risk assessment. Part V
and VI introduce a different use of frequency-consequence curves as a mean to assess and limit
societal risk. Part VII finally discusses the possibility of introducing such societal risk
assessment tool in the U.S. regulations.
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Part II. Overview of the licensing of nuclear power plants in the United States
The purpose of this part is to present the current licensing process of nuclear power plants. There
are two processes for current plants, codified under Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 10
Parts 50 and 52. An alternative licensing process for advanced nuclear plants is currently drafted
at the USNRC.
II.A. The Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act
In 1954, Congress amended the 1946 Atomic Energy Act making possible the development of
nuclear commercial activities.
The overall policy of the United States towards nuclear energy was defined in Section 1 of the
1954 Atomic energy Act (42 USC 2011), and consisted of two objectives:
"(a) The development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to
make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the
paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense
and security;
(b) The development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to
promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living,
and strengthen free competition in private enterprise."
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was authorized by Section 161(b) of the Act to:
"establish by rule, regulation or order, such standards and instructions to govern the
possession and use of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct
material as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the
common defense and security or to protect or minimize danger to life or property"
(42 USC 2201).
The 1974 Energy Reorganization Act established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials. The Commission, which assumed the regulatory
responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission, was assigned three regulatory functions:
rulemaking, licensing and inspection.
II.B. Current licensing process
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Licensing nuclear power plants is under the responsibility of the USNRC. Nuclear power plants
currently in operation, all Light Water Reactors (LWRs), have been licensed using a two-step
process. They must obtain both a construction permit and an operating license. This process is
detailed in 10 CFR Part 50 and briefly summarized below:
* In order to construct or operate a nuclear power plant, the applicant must submit a Safety
Analysis Report (SAR), which contains the design information and criteria for the proposed
plant, comprehensive data on the proposed site, and also a discussion of hypothetical
accident situations and the safety features available for both preventing and mitigating these
accidents, should they occur. The application also includes an assessment of the
environmental impact of the proposed plant and information for antitrust reviews.
* The USNRC staff reviews the application to determine if the plant design meets all the
applicable regulations contained in 10 CFR Parts 10, 50, 73, and 100. This step includes a
review of the design of the nuclear plant, the anticipated response of the plant to hypothetical
accidents, the emergency plans, and the characteristics of the site. The results of this review
are summarized in a Safety Evaluation Report. The Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS), an independent committee of experts, also reviews the application and
submits its results to the Commission.
* If the construction permit is issued, the applicant must then submit a Final Safety Analysis
Report to support its application for an operating license.
* The USNRC then prepares a Final Safety Evaluation Report, and the ACRS provides an
independent evaluation.
Based on the Atomic Energy Act, commercial power reactor licenses are issued for a 40 year
period, with the possibility of renewing the license for 20 years. The first 40-year operating
license will expire in 2009. The USNRC has established strict requirements codified in 10 CFR
51 and 10 CFR 54 for license renewal.
In 1989, USNRC established an alternative licensing process codified in 10 CFR 52 in order to
improve regulatory efficiency and a greater predictability in the licensing process. An early site
permit (ESP) gives a company approval for a plant site before a decision is actually made to
build the plant; and resolves site safety, environmental protection and emergency preparedness
- 17-
issues independently of a particular design. In the design certification process, USNRC examines
if the design meets regulatory safety standards. If accepted, the Commission drafts a rule to issue
the standard design certification as an appendix to 10 CFR 52.
Finally, a combined license authorizes construction and operation of the facility in a manner
similar to a construction permit under the two-step licensing process.
The USNRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research is currently taking a step ahead by drafting
an alternative to 10 CFR 50, which would be technology neutral, i.e. applicable to all reactor
technologies, and risk-informed (USNRC, 2006). Such task calls for new risk assessment tools,
such as frequency-consequence curves (F-C curves), for which no previous experience is
available. At the same time, the new licensing process must rely on fundamental safety principles
such as Defense-In-Depth that have greatly contributed until now to the safety of power plants.
-18-
Part III. Safety philosophy of nuclear power plants
The requirements a power plant must fulfill in order to get an operating license have evolved
greatly since the licensing of the first plant. They reflect today the two tenets of the safety
philosophy: the implementation of Defense-In-Depth and the existence of safety margins, which
are an integral part of the Defense-In-Depth concept, but are often discussed separately. Risk-
informing the licensing process calls for a greater reliance on risk quantification tools such as F-
C curves. In this part, we will describe these two safety principles to later be able to demonstrate
how F-C curves maintain both Defense-In-Depth principles and enhanced safety margins.
III.A. Defense-In-Depth
III.A.1. Definition
The concept of Defense-In-Depth has greatly evolved from a "narrow application to the multiple
barrier concept to an expansive application as an overall safety strategy" (Sorensen et al, 1999).
It is currently interpreted as follows:
* High-level protective strategies are implemented: preventing accident initiators from
occurring, terminating or mitigating accidents adequately, preventing degradation or failure
of barriers designed to contain radionuclides, and accident management plans to protect the
offsite public in case radionuclides penetrate the barriers.
* Multiple physical barriers are required (the "historical" approach).
In a 1999 White Paper on risk-informed and performance-based regulations (USNRC, 1999), the
Commission reaffirmed the crucial importance of Defense-In-Depth in its approach to safety:
"The concept of defense-in-depth has always been and will continue to be a
fundamental tenet of regulatory practice in the nuclear field. Risk insights can make
the elements of defense-in-depth clearer by quantifying them to the extent
practicable. Although the uncertainties associated with the importance of some
elements of defense may be substantial, the fact that these elements and uncertainties
have been quantified can aid in determining how much defense makes regulatory
sense. Decisions on the adequacy of or the necessity for elements of defense should
reflect risk insights gained through identification of the individual performance of
each defense system in relation to overall performance."
-19-
III.A.2. Rationalist and Structuralist Defense-In-Depth
A useful distinction between a "structuralist" model of Defense-In-Depth and a "rationalist" one
has been proposed (Sorensen et al, 1999):
* In the structuralist approach, "Defense-In-Depth" is embodied in the structure of the
regulations and in the design of the facilities built to comply with those regulations. The
requirements are derived by constantly asking the question: "what if this barrier fails?" no
matter what the probability of failure of the barrier is. Hence, emphasis is put on both
accident prevention and accident mitigation. The current safety approach, based on
deterministic principles, has relied on the structuralist Defense-In-Depth.
* The rationalist model asserts that "defense in depth is the aggregate of provisions made to
compensate for uncertainty and incompleteness in our knowledge of accident initiation and
progression." This model relies on quantitative acceptance criteria and requires that the
system be analyzed using risk assessment methods and the uncertainties be quantified before
being managed appropriately.
III.B. Safety Margins
As part of Defense-In-Depth, the main purpose of safety margins is to cope with uncertainties.
III.B.1. Epistemic and aleatory uncertainties
A useful classification of uncertainties into two categories is available in the literature
(Apostolakis, 1990, 1993): aleatory uncertainties, which are uncertainties in the model of the
world, and epistemic uncertainties, which are uncertainties in the state of knowledge. Such
categorization should not be interpreted as if there were in theory two types of probability
intended to represent these uncertainties, even if the distinction has useful implications in the
modeling of complex systems (Winkler, 1996).
Aleatory uncertainties deal with observable quantities (for instance the time to failure of a
component); they come from the fact that events can happen in a random or stochastic manner.
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For instance, a pump can fail to start due to a random failure. This type of uncertainty cannot be
reduced by further studies, but can be better characterized by additional research. It is usually
managed by probabilistic methods.
As opposed to aleatory uncertainties, epistemic uncertainties deal with non-observable quantities
and arise from our lack of knowledge or lack of scientific understanding. They can be reduced by
additional studies and fall into three categories:
* The first category consists of parameter uncertainty, which is uncertainty associated with the
values of the parameters of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models and the basic
data used in safety analysis such as failure rates, ultimate strength, etc. The values of these
parameters are not perfectly known.
* The second category of uncertainties, the model uncertainties, deals with the uncertainties
associated with the data limitations, analytical physical models, and acceptance criteria used
in the safety analysis. Experts may formulate different models in order to be as close to
reality as possible, even though these models are an approximation of the real phenomena.
For instance, model uncertainties arise when modeling human performance or common cause
failures such as fires.
* As for the third category, completeness uncertainty is the uncertainty associated with factors
not accounted for in the safety analysis, such as safety culture, unknown or unanticipated
failure mechanisms, etc. It can be considered a scope limitation, whose magnitude is difficult
to assess since it reflects an unanalyzed contribution to risk. It has often been referred to as
the "unknown unknown".
Let's consider an example to illustrate the differences between these types of uncertainties. A
designer might need to assess the values of a certain parameter in a given system or a component
on duty, for example the maximum pressure in the containment during a Loss of Coolant
Accident (LOCA). Even if the designer had a perfect knowledge of the system, his assessment of
the parameter would still be uncertain due to the existence of random phenomena. Moreover, the
uncertainties due to its lack of knowledge make the assessment of the parameter even more
uncertain: only a probability density function can capture the values of that parameter.
-21 -
PARAMETERPARAMETER
Figure 1: Illustration of epistemic uncertainties
III.B.2. Quantification of safety margins
Safe operation is ensured if safety variables (e.g. peak clad temperature, containment pressure)
remain within the capacity limits, defined as the values above or under which the system fails.
Safety margin is then defined as the difference between the characteristic value (e.g. the mean













Epistemic uncertainties reducedEpistemic uncertainties reducedEpistemic uncertaintiesEpistemic uncertainties
The capacity is often uncertain, and the regulator may choose to define a regulatory limit well
below the capacity. The definition of safety margin can then be defined as the sum of the design
margin and the regulatory margin. The design margin is the difference between the regulatory
limit and the characteristic value of the safety variable; and the regulatory margin is the
difference between the characteristic value of the capacity and the regulatory limit.
Figure 3: Design and regulatory margins (USNRC, 2006)
To calculate the characteristic value of the load: one can either do a best estimate calculation
using realistic codes and analyses, or one can make conservative assumptions to calculate a
value, that if below the acceptance criterion, ensure that adequate safety margin is provided
without having to quantify it. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the conservative and best
estimate approaches.
Input & Boundary Assumptions on
Applied codes Approach
and initial conditions system availability
Conservative codes Conservative input Conservative Deterministic
Best estimate
Conservative input Conservative Deterministic(realistic) codes
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Best estimate codes + Realistic input +
Conservative Deterministic
Uncertainties uncertainties
Best estimate codes + Realistic input + Deterministic +
PRA-based
Uncertainties uncertainties Probabilistic
Table 1: "Conservative approach" versus "Best estimate approach" (IAEA, 2001)
Adequate safety margins are currently ensured by requiring that the conservative value for the
safety variable be below the regulatory value for the capacity. For instance, 10 CFR Part 50.46
stipulates that the peak clad temperature during transients for a Light Water Reactor (LWR)
cannot exceed 22000C during a LOCA. The designer uses conservative assumptions to ensure
that this requirement is met. The "real" safety margin is not quantified. Research efforts are
currently undertaken to improve computer codes to allow best estimate calculations and
uncertainty analyses.
III.C. The trend towards risk-informing regulations
III.C.1. Defining risk quantitatively
Risk analysis is the discipline that has the objective of capturing risk by answering three
questions (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981): (1) what can happen?, (2) how likely is it that it will
happen?, and (3) if it does happen, what are the consequences? A risk analysis consists therefore
in identifying all the possible scenarios, for which both the probability and consequences are
assessed.
The "level-l" definition of risk by Kaplan and Garrick is a set of triplets that express for each
possible outcome its probability and consequence: R= (S, Pi,X,),i = 1,2...N}, with P, being the
probability of the scenarioS i , and X, the measure of damage or consequence measure of the
scenario. The integration of uncertainties leads to the "level-2" definition of risk.
There are several ways to display the risk of a system. Among them are risk-curves, which
express the frequency of exceeding a certain consequence (Complementary Cumulative Density
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Function). Epistemic uncertainties can be displayed on risk-curves (Figure 4). These curves have
to be read vertically: the frequency of exceeding a certain consequence is uncertain and the
different confidence levels for the frequency can be read vertically, as shown on the following
figure.
Consequence
Figure 4: Display of uncertainties on F-C curves
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is an analytical technique for systematically identifying
potential outcomes of a known initiating event. Major PRA studies include the 1975 Reactor
Safety Study and the 1990 NUREG-1150 study, which assessed the risk of severe accidents for
five nuclear power plants. There are several levels of PRA:
* Level-1 PRAs quantify the frequency of having core damage (CDF);
* Level-2 PRAs quantify the frequency of a large early release of radioactive material (LERF).
Figure 5 illustrates the different items that need to be assessed and quantified for a level-2
PRA;
* Level-3 PRAs calculate the off-site consequences of potential accidents. This latter level is
the most uncertain since it requires the modeling of radioactive plume dispersion and the
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Figure 5: PRA modeling
(Cazzoli et al, 1993)
III.C.2. Quantification of risk in the regulations
In parallel to the maturation of risk assessment tools, the USNRC started quantifying risk
acceptance criteria. In 1986, the USNRC issued the Safety Goal Policy Statement (USNRC,
1986), in which it stated what it judged to be an acceptable level of risk from nuclear power
plants. Two Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs) were defined:
"The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt
fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one
percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other
accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed.
The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities





one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other
causes."
In August 1995, the Commission issued a policy statement on the use of PRA methods in nuclear
regulatory activities (USNRC, 1995). The policy statement recommended that the use of PRA
technology be "increased in all regulatory matters in a manner that complements the USNRC's
traditional defense-in-depth philosophy." It also recommended that PRA and associated analyses
be used to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current regulatory requirements and
guides, license commitments, and staff practices, in order to focus the regulatory actions on
where the risk is the highest.
Significant change has been introduced in the past decades in the regulations and we can observe
an increasing reliance on risk quantification. However, there are still wide parts of the
regulations, such as licensing requirements, that haven't benefited fully from PRA insights.
III.D. Justifications for a new licensing approach
There are three types of issues associated with the current licensing approach:
* Current regulations focus on LWR design. This issue has already been raised at the USNRC
for reactor technologies such as the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), for which risk
metrics such as the Core Damage Frequency might not be applicable. Getting exempted from
LWR requirements is a long process, which necessarily creates unpredictability in licensing
and might discourage investment in new reactor designs.
* Deterministic requirements may cause unnecessary burden and may miss critical safety
issues. Regulators placed additional barriers and imposed new requirements asking the
question: What if we are wrong? What if barriers fail? This led to the addition of safety
features that did not necessarily increase plant safety. For instance, the "Reactor Safety
Study: An assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants", known
as WASH-1400 (USNRC, 1975), found that small LOCAs and transients were dominant
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contributors to the risk of a plant, contradicting the previous purely deterministic approach
that only considered very large pipe breaks in the reactor coolant system.
Unnecessary requirements may be very costly and therefore are a major drawback to
nuclear power development. In an article entitled "Who Killed U.S Nuclear Power?" Marsha
Freeman, associate editor of the magazine 21st Century Science Technology, points out the
role of nuclear regulatory actions in the seventies: "Billions of dollars were spent by nuclear
utilities to retrofit plants for increased safety, much of which retrofitting was known by many
in the industry to be unnecessary" (Freeman, 2001). Charles Komanoff, an energy economist
and environmental activist, released a study in 1981 (Komanoff, 1981) proposing that the
real cost in constant "steam-plant" dollars per kilowatt to complete nuclear power plants in
the United States increased by 142% from the end of 1971 to the end of 1978, taking into
account the inflation in the costs of standard construction inputs such as labor, equipment,
and materials.
Note however that quantification of the role of regulations on cost increases is a difficult task
and studies are scarce. Nuclear power plants are very complex systems, which makes it
difficult to directly relate one regulation to an increase in costs. However, even if figures are
exaggerated, most experts agree that the tremendous increase in requirements has had a very
strong impact on costs, while not all the new requirements were justified.
George Apostolakis, chairman of the ACRS PRA subcommittee, states that PRA has a great
role to play regarding "the regulatory burden that was created in some instances, such as in
quality assurance requirements" (Apostolakis, 2000). He further says that "one utility has
indicated that if it implemented graded quality assurance guidance, its savings would be up to
$ 2 million a year". Regulatory Guide 1.176 "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed
Decision making: Graded Quality Assurance" provides guidance on how to risk-inform the
regulations and requires quality assurance adjusted to the level of safety needed.
III.E. Conclusion
The objective of the framework drafted by the USNRC is to produce a risk-informed and
technology-neutral licensing process, which constitutes a major change in the regulations since it
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calls for an increase reliance on risk assessment tools while maintaining a high-level Defense-In-
Depth. Such task represents a tremendous challenge for both the regulator in charge of defining
the process and the industry, which will have to comply eventually.
F-C curves are a good example of the combination of probabilistic and deterministic principles:
They allow both a quantification of risk and the implementation of structuralist and rationalist
Defense-In-Depth through the quantification and implementation of safety margins.
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Part IV. Use of frequency-consequence curves in new reactor licensing
Regulations of nuclear power plants have focused until now on Light Water Reactors and have
not systematically incorporated insights and benefits from probabilistic risk assessment methods.
With the goal of risk-informing the regulations and making the licensing process more efficient,
predictable and stable for advanced reactors, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
recently drafted a technology-neutral framework for new plant licensing. The new licensing rules
would be applicable to Generation IV commercial nuclear power plants only, and would
constitute an alternative to 10 CFR Part 50. The current working draft released by the USNRC in
August 2006 (USNRC, 2006) envisions two major uses of F-C curves: a tool to ensure
implementation of the USNRC's safety expectations as well as a tool to identify and select the
Licensing Basis Events (LBEs), intended to replace the Design-Basis Accidents (DBAs).
The objective of this part is two-fold: first, present the F-C curve concept proposed by the
USNRC, and, second, understand the extent to which Licensing Basis Events constitute an
improvement over Design-Basis Accidents.
IV.A. Expected level of safety for future plants
The level of safety that new plants are expected to meet, captured by the framework, has been
defined in the policy statement on the regulation of advanced nuclear power plants (USNRC,
1994), in which the Commission has expressed two expectations:
* That advanced nuclear power plants will show enhanced margins of safety.
* That advanced reactor designs will comply with the Commission Safety Goal Policy
Statement, i.e. that plants will comply with the Quantitative Health Objectives.
A three-region approach to risk acceptability has been developed. The requirements developed
through the framework will ensure that the risk lies in the lower region, and that there is only a
small chance that the risk can be in the intermediate region, and a negligible probability that it
lies in the unacceptable region.
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Figure 6: Three Region Approach to Risk Tolerability
IV.B. Definition of frequency-consequence curves in the framework
The F-C curve proposed for use by the Commission's staff relates the frequency of potential
accidents to acceptable radiation dose released by these potential accidents for an individual at
the site boundary. The underlying principle is that the higher the consequence of an event, the
lower the frequency of the event must be. The F-C curve is derived from current regulatory










Figure 7: Frequency-consequence curve proposed in the USNRC framework
As an example, 10 CFR § 20.1301 specifies the dose limits for individual members of the public:
"Each licensee shall conduct operations so that the total effective dose equivalent to
individual members of the public from the licensed operation does not exceed 0.1
rem (1 mSv) in a year".
Therefore, events resulting in doses of 100 mrem shouldn't have a frequency above 1. This is
translated on Figure 7 by limiting the frequency of events resulting in doses of 5-100 rems to
0.01/ry. The figure presents the F-C curve proposed for use by the USNRC as of August 2006.
One should note that 10 CFR § 20.1301 specifies a limit on the integrated risk, not from a single
event; whereas the interpretation done for the F-C curve is on a single event basis.
IV.C. Use of the frequency-consequence curve to implement USNRC's high-level
safety expectations
IV.C.1. Each event sequence must lie individually below the F-C curve
A PRA has to be completed (whose technical requirements are detailed in the framework). The
PRA encompasses all internal and external events as well as all modes of plant operation. The
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and consequences are calculated with uncertainties accounted for: all accident sequences are
identified in terms of a distribution of their frequencies and end states.
To implement USNRC's high-level safety expectations, each event sequence, defined by its





Figure 8: Criterion for individual event sequence
IV.C.2. The integrated risk is not assessed with the frequency-consequence
curve
Each PRA sequence must meet individually the criterion imposed by the F-C curve on a mean
value basis, which implies that each sequence meets individually the QHOs. However, the
overall risk is not captured by the F-C curve and the PRA results must also demonstrate that the
total integrated risk over all accident sequences satisfy both QHOs.
To show compliance with the QHOs, a level-3 PRA is needed unless surrogates objectives can
be determined. For now, no surrogates similar to CDF and LERF have been defined on a
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technology-neutral basis for advanced reactors. However, even if surrogates were to be defined,
sufficient experience and time would be needed in order to have confidence in their use.
IV.D. Use of frequency-consequence curves to identify and select Licensing Basis
Events
IV.D.1. Design-Basis Accidents
The current fleet of U.S. reactors was licensed using a deterministic approach, which evolved
from the licensing of the first commercial power plant on a case-by-case basis to the emergence
in the mid sixties of generic criteria that the reactor design must meet.
A deterministic approach refers to the principle of "determinism", which holds that:
"Specific causes completely and certainly determine effects of all sorts. As applied in
nuclear technology, it generally deals with evaluating the safety of a nuclear power
plant in terms of the consequences of a predetermined bounding subset of accident
sequences" (USNRC Glossary, 2006).
Hence, the deterministic approach relies on the concept of design-basis accidents, which are
postulated accidents
"that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand without loss to the
systems, structures, and components necessary to assure public health and safety"
(USNRC Glossary, 2006).
These accidents envelop the whole spectrum of accidents. If a power plant is able to withstand
the design-basis accidents, which assume worst-case scenarios, then it is able to cope with all
accident challenges:
"The design basis accidents were not intended to be actual event sequences, but
rather, were intended to be surrogates to enable deterministic evaluation of the
response of a facility's engineered safety features. These accident analyses are
intentionally conservative in order to compensate for known uncertainties in accident
progression, fission product transport, and atmospheric dispersion" (USNRC
Regulatory Guide 1.183, 2000).
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Beyond design-basis accidents are, on the other hand, accident sequences that are possible, but
are not fully considered in the design process because they are judged to be too unlikely. The
redundancy of systems and extensive implementation of margins arising from Design-Basis
Accident evaluations have resulted in plant designs that have considerable robustness and
capability to mitigate potential severe accident scenarios (USNRC, 2004).
IV.D.1.a. The General Design Criteria
All the Light Water Reactors (LWRs) conceived and proposed to the AEC for construction
permits, from the Shippingport reactor in 1953 to Dresden 2 in 1965, were generated without a
set of safety criteria that the design must meet.
All Light Water Reactors (LWRs) conceived and proposed to the AEC for construction permits
from the Shippingport reactor in 1953 to Dresden 2 in 1965 were generated without a set of
safety criteria that the design must meet.
Prior to 1965, the individual design criteria evolved over the years on a case-by-case basis. New
criteria were introduced as the result of rector-specific or site-specific issues and tended to
emerge from questions about low-probability events not previously considered, or from unusual
operating experience with generic implications.
In 1965, the AEC staff started developing general design criteria. The original criteria were
revised in 1967 and again in 1971 when the AEC published a general set of design criteria that
became Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 states that:
"An application for a construction permit must include the principal design criteria
for a proposed facility. The principal design criteria establish the necessary design,
fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures,
systems, and components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and
components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated
without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
These General Design Criteria establish minimum requirements for the principal
design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to
plants for which construction permits have been issued by the Commission"
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One of the most famous criteria is the single failure criterion. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50
defined "single failure" as:
"An occurrence which results in the loss of capability of a component to perform its
intended safety functions. Multiple failures resulting from a single occurrence are
considered to be a single failure. Fluid and electric systems are considered to be
designed against an assumed single failure if neither (1) a single failure of any active
component (assuming passive components function properly) nor (2) a single failure
of a passive component (assuming active components function properly), results in a
loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions."
Other criteria, such as criterion 35 on the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) refer to the
concept of single failure. Criterion 35 states that the emergency cooling system should be
designed to withstand a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) defined as double-ended
rupture of the largest pipe of the reactor coolant system, the concurrent loss of offsite power, and
a single failure of an active EECS component in the worst possible place.
IV.D.1.b. Design-basis accidents as a tool to show compliance with
licensing requirements
The design-basis accidents stem from the General Design Criteria.
10 CFR 50.34 requires that each application for a construction permit for a nuclear reactor
facility include a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and that each application for a
license to operate such a facility include a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Section 50.34
specifies in general terms the information to be supplied in these Safety Analysis Reports
(SARs). Regulatory Guide 1.70 describes in more details the information that should be provided
in the SAR. Chapter 15 of the Safety Analysis Report focuses on accident analyses and provides
guidance on the classification of events and on the methodology that should be used. As
mentioned earlier, the applicant must show that its design conforms to the General Design
Criteria and that the plant is able to withstand the postulated design-basis accidents
For instance, an applicant can postulate a LOCA inside the containment, assuming a worst case
of piping break in order to represent an envelope evaluation for liquid or steam line failure inside
the containment. The assumptions and calculations should be conservative.
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As an example, Regulatory Guide 1.3 indicates what type of conservative assumptions should be
done (e.g. "infinite cloud" assumption). Regulatory Guide 1.70, that provides guidance for the
SAR, acknowledges that "there may be instances in which the applicant will not agree with the
conservative margins inherent the design basis approach approved by the USNRC staff' and in
which the applicant might want to do a realistic analysis. The applicant may present his analysis
but he is reminded that "the known USNRC assumptions should nevertheless be used in the
design basis analysis."
IV.D.1.c. The "Maximum Credible Accident" concept
Another postulated accident, which plays a fundamental role in the licensing process, is the
"Maximum Credible Accident", postulated for siting purposes.
According to David Okrent, former ACRS member and author of a book on the history of the
regulatory process (Okrent, 1981), the principle was mentioned by Clifford Beck, member of the
regulatory staff, in a nuclear congress in Rome in 1959. The philosophy behind Design-Basis
Accidents was summarized then as follows:
"If the worst conceivable accidents are considered, no site except one removed from
population areas by hundreds of miles would offer sufficient protection. On the other
hand, if safeguards are included in the facility design against all possible accidents
having unacceptable consequences, then it could be argued that any site, however
crowded, would be satisfactory... assuming of course that the safeguards would not
fail and some dangerous potential accidents had not been overlooked. In practice, a
compromise position between these two extremes is taken. Sufficient reliance is
placed on the protective features to remove most of the concern about the worst
conceivable accidents, though there is seldomly sufficient confidence in the facility
safeguards to be sure that all hazards have been eliminated. Thus, a possible reactor
site is reviewed against the possibility of credible accidents, and their consequences,
which might occur despite the safeguards present.
It is inherently impossible to give an objective definition or specification for
"credible accidents" and thus the attempt to identify these for a given reactor entails
some sense of futility and frustration, and further, it is never entirely assured that all
potential accidents have been examined."
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Clifford Beck, in this speech, puts the emphasis on the difficulty of defining credible accidents
and on the need for additional barriers due to lack of knowledge (epistemic) uncertainties, laying
the ground for the concept of defense-in-depth.
Following up on this idea in 1961, the AEC, under the leadership of Clifford Beck, published for
comment in the Federal Register, siting criteria that included concepts such as a low-population
zone, an exclusion area, and a population center distance:
"For purposes of site evaluation, an accident was postulated in which the noble gases
and half the radioiodine were released to a containment building that was assumed to
maintain its integrity, and in which guideline doses of 25 rem whole body and 300
rem to the thyroid were not to be exceeded under the specified conditions. This
postulated accident (the maximum credible accident or MCA) whose consequences
were not to be exceeded by any credible accident, became the focus of siting
evaluation. [...] Most safety improvements which developed were related to meeting
the requirements of the postulated MCA."(Okrent, 1981)
The use of postulated accidents to show compliance with siting requirements is still in the
regulations. Section 100.11 of 10 CFR Part 100 provides criteria for determining the Exclusion
Area, Low Population Zone, as well as the Population Center Distance. To evaluate a proposed
site, the applicant should assume a fission product release, "based upon a major accident,
hypothesized for purposes of site analysis or postulated from considerations of possible
accidental events that would result in potential hazards not exceeded by those from any accident
considered credible. Such accidents have generally been assumed to result in substantial
meltdown of the core with subsequent release of appreciable quantities of fission products."
IV.D.1.d. The difficulty of dealing with incredible accidents
Although the notion of "credibility" seems to refer to the concept of likelihood and probability,
expert judgment and experience were the basis for defining credible accidents. The question of
how to deal with incredible accidents has always been a thorny issue. It is important to note that
the Maximum Credible Accident was assumed to be contained.
The difficulty of dealing with incredible accidents can be illustrated by the question of the
reactor pressure vessel integrity that arose in 1965 (Okrent, 1981). The AEC regulatory staff was
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unwilling to consider accidents it qualified as incredible. The issue of the integrity of the reactor
pressure vessel had been raised several times by the ACRS before 1965. For instance, in a 1961
report to the AEC, it recommended the development of adequate codes and standards for the
pressure vessel and other parts of the primary systems of power plants. However, failure of the
reactor pressure vessel was considered as "incredible" for the LWR and BWR reviewed before
1965. No protection against gross vessel failure was provided, even though the possible
consequences of such failure would have potentially led to a major uncontrolled release of
radioactivity.
The issue was especially complex since there did not seem to be clearly feasible way to prevent
core melt and ensure containment integrity in case of a catastrophic pressure vessel failure. At an
ACRS subcommittee meeting dedicated to the Dresden II reactor licensing application, the
vendor representative, asked about the consequences of a potential pressure vessel, replied, "The
containment could withstand a larger break than the maximum credible accident but not a
complete break of the pressure vessel." In November 1965, the ACRS recommended in a letter
to the AEC that some provisions be made against the unlikely accidents and that means be
developed to ameliorate the consequences of a major vessel pressure rupture (Okrent, 1981).
In a 1967 paper presented to the IAEA, Farmer criticized the approach taken in differentiating
credible accidents from incredible ones:
"No engineering plant and no structure is entirely risk free, and there is no logical
way of differentiating between credible and incredible accidents. The incredible is
often made up of a combination of very ordinary events - for example the breakdown
or the deterioration that occurs in normal plants and their measuring instruments -
and the credible may actually be exceedingly improbable. The logical way of dealing
with this situation is to seek to assess the whole spectrum or risks in a quantity-
related manner" (Farmer, 1967).
IV.D.1.e. Licensing Basis Events should replace Design-Basis
Accidents
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Design Basis-Accidents (DBAs) are inherited from a purely deterministic approach to safety.
Furthermore, they might not be applicable anymore to reactors different from LWRs. They must
be therefore replaced.
The identification and selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) is a fundamental difference
between the previous licensing process and the one proposed in the new framework. LBEs are
accidents that must be considered in the plant safety analysis and that represent a challenge to
safety. They play a role in the licensing process similar to the DBAs, for they provide assurance
that the design meets various accident challenges with adequate margins. However, LBEs
encompass a much broader range of events since they also include, for instance, some events that
do not involve radioactive release. There are two ways of selecting LBEs: a probabilistic
selection from the PRA sequences, as well as a deterministic selection process that ensure that all
uncertainties are accounted for. LBEs are chosen so that their aggregate represents the whole
frequency range of the F-C curve.
IV.D.2. Probabilistic selection of Licensing Basis Events
The probabilistic selection process of LBEs uses the results of the full scope PRA: once all the
PRA sequences have been defined in terms of a distribution of their frequencies and end states,
LBEs can be selected from the PRA sequences
IV.D.2.a. Steps for Licensing Basis Event selection
The PRA is first modified so as to credit the mitigating functions that are to be considered safety-
significant: indeed, any function and the associated Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs)
included in the PRA and used to define the LBEs is considered safety-significant unless
guaranteed failure has been assumed. The selection process of LBEs is as follows:
* The point estimate frequency for each resulting event sequence of the modified PRA is
calculated. Only the event sequences with a point estimate frequency above 10-8 /ry are
eligible for the LBE selection process.
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* The mean and 95th percentile for all event sequences remaining is determined, and all the
event sequences whose 95 th percentile frequency is below 10-7 are screened out.
* Similar accident sequences, defined as sequences that "have a similar initiator and display
similar accident behavior in terms of system failures and/or phenomena and lead to similar
source terms" are then grouped together in event classes.
* For each event class, the event sequence with the bounding consequence is selected. The
selected event sequence defines the accident behavior and consequence.
* Then, for each event class, the LBE frequency is determined by setting the LBE's mean
frequency equal to the highest mean frequency of the event sequences, and the 9 5 th percentile
equal to the highest 95 th percentile frequency. The parameters of LBEs are illustrated on
Figure 9:
9 5th percentile value for frequency
Distribution 95lupercentile LBE with:
for frequency value for dose LE with:Frequency = 95th percentile value for frequency
Dose = 95t percentile value for dose
Distribution for dose
Figure 9: Parameters of Licensing Basis Events
One should not that such process might be difficult to implement for the highest event frequency
category, since there is no release of radioactivity. Therefore, engineering judgment may be
used.
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Modification of the PRA so as to credit those mitigating functions that are to be considered
safety-significant
Event sequences with point estimate frequency less than IE-8 are screened out
Determination of mean and 95th percentile for all event sequences remaining
Screening out of all the event sequences whose 95th percentile frequency is below 1E-7
Grouping of previously identified sequences into similar accident sequences
I For each event class, select LBEs as follows: Select sequences with highestconsequences as LBE candidates
For each event class, the LBE
frequency is determined by setting 7
Consider new event class Refine event class or modify design the LBE's 951h percentile equal to the
highest 95 h percentile frequencies.
No
Does LBE meet acceptance criteria? )
Yes
Have all event classes been considered?
No
If needed, add LBE based on
engineering judgment Complete set of LBEs
Figure 10: Selection process of Licensing Basis Events
IV.D.2.b. Criteria for selected Licensing Basis Events
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Figure 11: Criterion for probabilistically-selected LBE
Furthermore, for defense-in-depth purposes, LBEs must meet additional deterministic criteria.
For that purpose, the region below the F-C curve is divided into three frequency regions, as
shown in Figure 12. The rationale for such division is summarized in Table 2. The principle is
that it is desirable to have more stringent deterministic criteria for frequent events, than for less
frequent events.
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Category Frequency Basis for choice
Frequent > 10-2 /ry (mean value) Captures all event sequences expected to
occur at least once in lifetime of a plant,
assumed to be 60 years
Infrequent < 10-2 /ry and Captures all event sequences expected to
> 10-' /ry (mean value) occur at least once in lifetime of population of
plants, assumed to be 1000
Rare < 10-5/ry and Captures all event sequences not expected to
> 10-' /ry (mean value) occur in lifetime of the plant population, but
needed to assess the Commission's safety
goals
Table 2: Classification of event sequences according to their mean frequency
The previous table applies to event sequences, not only initiating event (IE) frequencies. The
framework suggests that each applicant propose cumulative limit on IE frequencies for each of
the LBE frequency event categories (for instance, the initiating events with potential to defeat
two or more protective strategies should have a frequency below 10-7 per plant year). The
USNRC and the applicant must agree upon the cumulative IE frequency, taking into account the
design characteristics. The limits are monitored on the long term by a living PRA.
The LBEs, based on their frequency category must meet additional deterministic criteria.
Category Frequency Deterministic criteria
Frequent > 10-2/ry (mean value) - No impact on the safety analysis assumption
occurs
- No barrier failure occurs
- Redundant means of reactor shutdown remain
functional
- Redundant means of decay heat removal remain
functional
Infrequent < 10-2/ry and - A coolable geometry is maintained
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> 10- / ry (mean value) - At least one barrier remains
- At least one means of reactor shutdown remains
functional
- At least one means of decay heat removal
remains functional
Rare < 10-5 /ry and No additional deterministic criteria
> 10-7 /ry (mean value)
Table 3: Additional deterministic criteria depending on frequency category
Furthermore, depending on the frequency category, LBEs must satisfy additional dose criteria.
For instance, in the higher event frequency category, the cumulative dose has to be below the
5mrem dose specification of 10 CFR 10 Appendix I.
Frequency per ry
4CF
* 9 5 th percentile value for
Dose/Frequency must be below FC-
curve
* + Deterministic criteria depending on
the frequency region
* + Integrated dose criteria depending
on the frequency region
-I -------
Dose, in rem
Figure 13: Summary criteria for LBEs
IV.D.3. Deterministic selection of Licensing Basis Events
For siting concerns, one LBE has to be postulated deterministically so as to prove that, regardless
of the features incorporated in the plant to prevent an unacceptable release of radioactive
material from the fuel and the reactor coolant system, there are additional ways to prevent an
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unacceptable release to the public. This LBE has to be analyzed mechanistically using
conservative assumptions. This event is the event postulated in 10 CFR 100.
IV.E. Analogy between the current framework draft and Farmer paper
In 1967, Farmer proposed to use a F-C curve in order to assess the risk of a power plant from a
siting perspective. The F-C curve proposed by the USNRC presents some analogy with the
Farmer curve. In both approaches, accident sequences are first analyzed using risk quantification
techniques and their acceptability is assessed on a frequency-consequence diagram, based on the
similar principle that the higher the consequence of an event sequence is, the lower its frequency
must be:
"A measure of risk can be obtained by estimating the probability of the failure and
assessing the consequences. Any initiating event - for example, failure of piping,
delays in the operation of control systems, loss of circulator power, or combinations
of these - can set up an accident sequence that can follow many paths [...] The full
safety evaluation then comprises a spectrum of events with associated probabilities
and associated consequences". (Farmer, 1967)
However, if both curves present many similarities, the consequences considered are highly
different. Indeed, the Farmer paper addresses siting problems in the sense it limits for each event
sequence the total amount of radioactive 1311 released. Therefore, Farmer addresses societal risk.
The USNRC draft addresses individual risk, i.e. the dose for an individual at the site boundary.
IV.F. Improvements due to Licensing Basis Events
The definition and use of LBEs contributes greatly to the definition of a technology-neutral and
risk-informed licensing process. Several improvements should be noted:
Calculations to obtain the distribution of frequency and dose are realistic; except for the
source term calculated using the 95th value of the probability range for the amount of
radionuclides released. Distributions on the frequency and the dose are assessed.
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* The probabilistically selected LBEs contribute to the existence of quantifiable safety margins.
Regulatory limits on the frequency and consequence of potential events are set by the F-C
curve so that adequate regulatory margin is provided. There is indeed a lot of uncertainty
regarding the health effects caused by defined radioactive doses, which calls for a
conservative regulatory limit. The designer can define additional design margins (distance





Figure 14: Licensing Basis Event Margins
* The framework allows a performance-based approach: indeed, the designer may choose to
add deterministic LBEs based on his judgment, but this is not required beforehand by the
regulator.
* Defense-In- Depth (both structuralist and rationalist) remains a fundamental principle of the
approach: LBEs must satisfy certain fundamental criteria depending on their frequency
(rationalist and structuralist Defense-In-Depth), and the postulated accident for siting
purposes ensures that a balance between prevention and mitigation is maintained
(structuralist Defense-In-Depth). Implementation of safety margins ensures that uncertainties
are adequately coped with.
IV.G. Conclusion
F-C curves are powerful risk assessment tools, for they provide enhanced safety margins and a
rational way to define Licensing Basis Events.
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USNRC's use of F-C curves is quite innovative, since these tools are classically used to assess
societal risk as opposed to individual risk. The question of including societal risk in the
regulations has been regularly raised and it is legitimate in the context of the new framework to
ask if societal risk should be included in the new licensing approach, and how could F-C
contribute to societal risk assessment.
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Part V. What is societal risk?
Before considering the use of F-C curves for societal risk assessment, we will define in this part
what societal risk is, and introduce the general concepts attached to it, for instance multiple-
fatality aversion. In the more specific context of nuclear power plants, we will identify three
main sources of societal risk increase: a degradation of the plant safety, an increase of the core
inventory, which can in turn increase the risk to the population as a whole, and an increase in the
number of people living around the plant.
V.A. What is societal risk as opposed to individual risk?
V.A.1. Individual risk
A distinction is made in the literature between the risk to an individual, the individual risk, and
the risk to groups of people, known as societal risk. In both cases, the definition of risk is
reduced to a point value, usually the mean risk.
Many definitions of individual risk exist. The definition used for the purpose of risk management
policy in the Netherlands (Versteeg, 1992) is the following:
"Individual risk is defined as the expected frequency of death due to a hazard of a
hypothetical unprotected person, who is permanently located out of the doors, at any
given fixed location beyond the perimeter of the installation concerned"
But the definition can be more general as well, such as the one provided by the Institute of
Chemical Engineers (Ichem, 1985):
"The individual risk is the frequency at which an individual may be expected to
sustain a given level of harm from the realization of specified hazards."
In the U.S. nuclear risk management field, the individual fatality risk is further refined: the
Quantitative Health Objectives make a distinction between individual early fatality risk (mainly
an individual's probability of becoming a prompt casualty of a reactor accident in a given year)
and the individual latent fatality risk, for which the death occurs many years later.
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V.A.2. Societal risk
Parallel definitions exist for societal risk. The most widely used definition for societal risk is the
one proposed by the Institute of Chemical Engineers (Ichem, 1985) which defines societal risk
as:
"The relationship between frequency and the number of people suffering from a
specified level of harm in a given population from the realization of specified
hazards". The definition does not give further precisions on what is meant by
"harm".
The term "societal risk" has been traditionally associated with the number of fatalities in the case
of an accident. However, others have seen societal risk as a much broader concept, including
fatalities as well as other aspects of harm.
Experts have proposed (Ball and Floyd, 1998) to distinguish four categories of societal risks: the
"collective risks", the "simple societal risks", the "diverse societal risks", and the "societal
concerns". These categories are not mutually exclusive but correspond to a progression in the
definition of societal risk and in the complexity of the tools to assess it, from the easily defined
collective risks to the highly political "societal concerns".
* The first category (collective risks) deals with the diffuse risks associated with normal
activities, such as radiation from nuclear materials or waste during normal activity.
Generally, this type of risk is dealt with by setting an individual limit and by using cost-
benefit analysis methods. The risk to society can be expressed as the product of the
individual risk by the total number of people exposed.
* The second category ('simple' societal risks) casts risk in term of the number of fatalities that
could be caused by an accident. It is based on the principle that often, fatalities are the best
surrogate to express the seriousness of an accident and provide a simplified basis for risk
evaluation. The most common tools to assess the 'simple' societal risk are FN curves. Those
curves will be defined in part VI.A. An example is shown on the following figure:
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Probability of exceedance N fatalities per year
Figure 15: Example of FN curve, which displays the probability of having N or more
fatalities per year, as a function of N, on a double logarithmic scale
* The third category' ('diverse' societal risks) consists in an extension of the second category
and considers FN criteria based on fatalities but also on other types of harm such as
environmental damage or injuries. However, few attempts have been made to translate such
risk measures into criteria.
* Finally the fourth category (societal concerns) deals with risks from both normal activity and
accidents and is the most complex one. The authors insist that:
"At the policy or decision-making level, the crude use of FN curves based on
fatalities is meaningless [...]. Nuclear FN curves tend to have a long tail at low
probabilities, but it is seldom made clear that it is predicted on fundamental
assumptions about the shape of the dose-response curve for ionizing radiation at very
low doses, itself an increasingly hotly-debated topic [...]. Clearly, at this strategic
level, decision-makers have to consider the full range of potential impacts (associated
with both 'normal' activities and accidents) including fatalities, non-fatal injuries,
property damage, environmental impacts, psycho-social harm, economic loss,
business interruption costs, and even the political consequences of major accidents.
Open-ended definitions of this kind tend to be anathema to those whose focus is
numerical analysis since many of the components are difficult to handle if not
beyond quantification and, even if quantifiable, could not be easily assimilated into a
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decision model. In practice, however, optimum decisions can ultimately only be
made by considering all of the goals and all of the consequences of various decision
options, and in the final stages of policy formulation it is imperative that this be
done".
On that level, attempts to quantify societal risk are currently being made. The ExternE project
(Hirschberg, 1999) for instance aims at quantifying the external costs (production and transportation
costs) of different sources of electricity: wind, solar, nuclear, biomass, coal, oil, natural gas, and
hydroelectric. This interdisciplinary project uses Life Cycle Analysis (LCA), a method used to identify
in details the inventory of material and energy flows associated with all stages of the life of an activity.
The idea is that external costs of electricity have to be understood and known in order to be able to
internalize the cost in the price of electricity, and make more rational energy choices. For instance, the
occupational risk of coal miners or the environmental cost of pollution should be included in the price of
coal. As for nuclear, the study aims at quantifying the external costs of the entire fuel cycle, including
societal risk due to routine operation and accidents of nuclear power plants.
Table 4 summarizes the different categories determined by Ball and Floyd:
Risk associated with:
'Normal Accidents Suggested term Type of criteria
activity'
Diffuse risk associated with Yes No Collective risks Individual risk +
exposure to hazardous Cost-Benefit
material Analysis
'Simple' risk associated with No Yes Societal risks FN criteria
hazardous based on
installations/activities which fatalities
can be easily compared
'Diverse' risks associated No Yes Societal risks FN criteria
with hazardous based on
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installations/activities which fatalities and
required a broader basis for other types of
meaningful comparison harm
Comparison of overall Yes Yes Societal Political




Table 4: Categories of risks
(Ball and Floyd, 1998)
V.A.3. Why isn't putting a limit on individual risk enough?
Individual and societal risks deal with different issues. Putting a limit on individual risk is an
equity measure, meaning that each individual is entitled the same level of safety. Most countries
that have chosen to put a quantitative limit on risk have included a limit on individual risk, be it
the United States, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.
Individual risk does not take into account the total number of people exposed to the hazard. On
the contrary, societal risk is a function of the total population exposed. Two nuclear power
plants, each complying with the QHOs, can entail different societal risks.
Let's develop a very simple example in order to illustrate this fact:
* Consider two identical nuclear power plants, one for which there are 1000 people located in
the vicinity of the plant, the other one for which there are 100,000 persons. Assume
furthermore that two independent scenarios only can lead to fatalities: 'Scenario A' has a
likelihood of 10-4 per year and 'Scenario B' a likelihood of 10-5 per year. Assume also that,
if 'Scenario A' occurs, one person out of five located in the vicinity of the plant will die, and
one out of two for the same region but considering 'Scenario B'.
10-4  10-
* The individual fatality risk is equal to - + - = 2.5 * 10- ' per year for both plants.5 2
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* There are several ways to calculate the societal risk, depending on its definition. If we
assume the societal risk is captured by the expected number of fatalities per year, the societal
risk in the first case is 2.5 * 10- 5 * 1000 = 2.5 * 10-2 expected fatalities per year, whereas it is
equal to 2.5 in the second case.
This example uses simplistic assumptions. In general, there is no direct relation between
individual and societal risk. However, it illustrates the fact that two systems complying with
individual risk limits might have different societal risk profiles.
Figure 16 illustrates the different parameters considered:
Figure 16: Illustration of the difference between individual and societal risk
V.B. General questions on societal risk
V.B.1. At what level societal risk should be considered?
The Ichem definition of societal risk does not specify the level (e.g. site, regional, national) at
which societal risk should be considered.
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Situation 2
The individual risk is the same for situations 1 and 2
The societal risk is higher in situation 2
Situation 1
The approach chosen by the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Land Use Planning and Environment
(VROM) assumes that societal risk is measured at the level of an installation (Versteeg, 1992).
However, other "levels" of societal risk are possible. Vrijling argues that certain risks that seem
acceptable at an individual/site level may not be acceptable at the national level (Vrijling et al,
1995). He concludes that acceptance of societal risk takes place at a national level. A convincing
example that he chooses to present is the commercialization of a toy that would cause a child's
death at a frequency of 10-4 per year per toy. Compared to risk from other accidents, one can say
that from an individual point of view, the toy is relatively safe. If 1000 children use the toy, the
expected number of death is 0 or 1 per year. However, if the toy becomes very popular and
107 toys are sold, the expected number of deaths will be 1000, which is clearly unacceptable at a
national level.
It is interesting to ask if the previous example applies to nuclear power plants. The idea in the toy
example is that the toys are identical, and therefore the risks perfectly correlated. This is not true
for nuclear power plants. On a high-level, two plants can differ by their design and the way they
are operated (for instance the safety culture might be different). In the United States, there is a
variety of vendors and utilities, which favors a site-level approach. This might not be valid in
other countries: for instance in France, all reactors have been built by the same vendor, and there
is currently only one utility, Electricit6 de France, operating them.
In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, agency responsible for health
and safety regulations in Great Britain) has argued that since any plant in the country could be
the source of an accident, it is not the risk per plant that matters but the risk attached to the whole
family of plants (HSE, 1992). On the other side, imposing a national limit on societal risk would
limit the total number of reactors that could be built.
Defining the level at which societal risk should be considered is a matter of policy. The 1986
individual risk limits were not intended to be used at a site level. However, in practice, they were
used as benchmarks for individual plants. Therefore, a site-level is more appropriate for nuclear
power plants in the U.S.
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V.B.2. Should risk aversion be included in the societal risk measures?
V.B.2.a. Definition
Risk aversion is a concept explaining the behavior of consumers and investors under uncertainty.
It is generally defined as the reluctance of a person to accept a lottery with an uncertain payoff
rather than another lottery with more certain but possibly lower expected payoffs. In the context
of societal risk, a key question is whether more weight should be given to a large accident with
many fatalities than to several smaller accidents producing the same total number of fatalities.
We will therefore refer to this concept as the multiple-fatality aversion concept. Three attitudes
towards multiple fatalities are possible: risk neutrality, risk aversion, and risk proneness, as
illustrated on Figure 17.
Social cost Social cost
Lives lost





Figure 17: Categories of multiple-fatality risk aversion
(Slovic, 1984)
Policy makers have generally relied on the idea that society was multiple-fatality averse, an
assumption revisited by Slovic (Slovic, 1984). According to Slovic, modeling the impact of an
accident by a risk-averse function of the number of fatalities is inadequate. Accidents with very
few fatalities or even none may have higher societal costs then accidents involving more
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fatalities. For him, accidents serve as "signals" of the nature and controllability of risk they
imply. For instance, an accident whose consequences are well understood, familiar and with little
potential for a catastrophe will have a much lower social cost as an accident with the same
number of fatalities but that does not meet the previously mentioned criteria.
Keeney (Keeney, 1980) has presented several assumptions that he has proved to lead to risk-
proneness: the first assumption states that a sure loss of N persons is less desirable than the 50-
50% chance of losing either 2N or 0 person(s), which was supported by some empirical
evidence. Second, Keeney argues that as N gets larger, each incremental life lost has less
marginal societal impact.
Ball and Floyd of the British Health and Safety Executive support a risk-neutral position:
'"Though documented evidence is sparse, nowhere have we found any compelling
support of arguments for an ex-ante stance of other than risk-neutrality in societal
decision making" (Ball and Floyd, 1998).
V.B.2.b. Inclusion of risk-aversion into criterion and measure
There are several ways to model risk-aversion:
* The most commonly used method is to include a risk aversion factor: for instance the societal
cost C(N) of N fatalities can be taken to be equal to Na, with a > 1:
C(N) = N" (Equation 1)
The societal cost of having 2N fatalities is more than twice costlier as the societal cost of
having N fatalities since C(2N) = (2N)a = 2 aN > 2(Na). This has been referred to as the
a-model by Slovic (Slovic, 1984) and has been applied in the Netherlands with a factor equal
to 2.
* Another possibility consists in integrating the standard deviation into the equation. A
measure of total risk (TR) defined by the sum of the expected value of the number of
fatalities and the standard deviation multiplied by a risk aversion factor k has been proposed
(Jonkman et al, 2003): TR = E(N) + kcr(N) (Equation 2)
- 57 -
It is of course possible to derive risk-neutral societal risk criteria by setting the risk aversion
factors respectively equal to 1 for a in Equation 1 (this approach has been chosen in the United
Kingdom and is known as the Canvey line, but it is not used to assess the tolerability of nuclear
risk) and 0 for k in Equation 2.
V.C. Quantitative risk limits in the United States
V.C.1. The 1986 Safety Goals
The process of defining quantitative risk limits in the United States was a long and complex one.
In 1986, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission adopted a Policy Statement on Safety Goals
for nuclear power reactors (USNRC, 1986) in order to define an acceptable level of radiological
risk, and stated that there were two qualitative safety goals:
"Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the
consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no
significant additional risk to life and health
Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be
comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing
technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks."
The Commission translated these qualitative safety goals into quantitative ones; known as the
Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs) and previously cited in Part III. We remind here their
statement:
"The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant (region
between the site boundary of the power plant and one mile beyond this boundary) of
prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one tenth
of one percent of the sum of prompt fatality risks that result from other accidents to
which the U.S. population is generally exposed.
The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant (region between the
site boundary of the power plant and ten miles beyond this boundary) of cancer
fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one
tenth of one percent of the sum of cancer fatality risks from all other causes."
Many have argued that the quantitative safety goals did not take into account the total societal
risk by imposing a limit on the total number of fatalities that could result from a nuclear accident.
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This issue was addressed as soon as 1986, in the Safety Goals Policy Statement itself, by
Commissioner Bernthal in his separate view on Safety Goals Policy:
"As they stand, these 0.1 percent goals do not explicitly include population density
considerations; a power plant could be located in Central Park and still meet the
Commission's quantitative offsite release standard" (USNRC, 1986).
The issue was raised periodically afterwards as a modification of the Safety Goals was prepared.
However, this modification was never achieved and it seems today that the very same
Quantitative Health Objectives will be used for the next generation of reactors (USNRC, 2006).
V.C.2. Surrogate Risk Metrics
Showing compliance with the QHOs requires a level-3 PRA that calculates the risks to an
individual. Those PRAs require an intense modeling of the event sequences, and the
uncertainties are very high. Those uncertainties exist independently of the PRA (for instance the
health effects due to radiation exposure are uncertain), but the PRA displays these uncertainties,
and deciding on the acceptability of risk might be difficult.
To deal with this issue, surrogate risk metrics were developed. A level-i PRA is necessary to
calculate the CDF of a plant. A level-2 PRA calculates both the CDF and the LERF. For current
reactors, the limits were set at 10-4 /reactor year for the CDF and 10-5 /reactor year for the LERF.
Interestingly enough, the limits are put on the frequency, no matter of the possible consequences
(for instance, the consequence of a large early release depends on the core inventory).
V.D. Sources of societal risk
If we consider a nuclear power plant, there are mainly three sources of societal risk increase:
degradation of the plant safety, increase of the core inventory, or an increase in the number of
people around the plant. These two issues are very different. The first deals with plant
characteristics, the second with siting decisions.
V.D.1. Issue of siting
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Societal risk criteria are closely related to siting decisions. Indeed, one of the arguments for not
defining a societal risk limit in the United States is that it is already included in 10 CFR Part 100.
Several points have to be made regarding 10 CFR Part 100:
* No allowable population density around a reactor is quantitatively specified. Section 3
provides a definition for the Low Population Zone (LPZ), which is:
"The area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which contains residents, the
total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that
appropriate protective measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a
serious accident. These guides do not specify a permissible population density or
total population within this zone because the situation may vary from case to case."
Section 10 only mentions the population density as one of the factors that should be
considered for evaluating a site: "Population density and use characteristics of the
site environs, including the exclusion area, low population zone, and population
center distance"
* An accident is postulated to assess the acceptability of a site but the quantitative dose limits
only apply to individuals. Indeed, section 11 states that:
"As an aid in evaluating a proposed site, an applicant should assume a fission
product release from the core, the expected demonstrable leak rate from the
containment and the meteorological conditions pertinent to his site to derive an
exclusion area, a low population zone and population center distance. For the
purpose of this analysis, which shall set forth the basis for the numerical values used,
the applicant should determine the following:
* An exclusion area of such size that an individual located at any point on its
boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated fission
product release would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in
excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid
from iodine exposure.
* A low population zone of such size that an individual located at any point on its
outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the
postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would
not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a
total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure.
* A population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance
from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. In applying
this guide, the boundary of the population center shall be determined upon
consideration of population distribution. Political boundaries are not controlling
in the application of this guide. Where very large cities are involved, a greater
distance may be necessary because of total integrated population dose
consideration."
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Note that the definition of the population center distance refers to the population density around
the reactor but gives no quantitative indications.
Figure 18: Siting distances in 10 CFR 100
There is a trade-off between safety and siting convenience. The closer a plant is from a
metropolitan area, the lower are the costs but the higher are the societal risks. One can also
remind briefly the Ravenswood siting controversy, when a nuclear power plant was proposed for
construction in the highly populated Queens borough of New York City.
To conclude, one can say that 10 CFR Part 100 deals with societal risk in a qualitative manner
but fails to define an acceptable quantitative level of societal risk.
V.D.2. Plant characteristics
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Even if there is no change in the population around the plant, societal risk may increase due to
plant characteristics themselves:
* If the probabilities of event sequences leading to an accident increase: for instance, for a
given number of people living around the plant, if the probability of an accident sequence
goes up because of the aging of certain components, societal risk is higher.
* If the potential consequences of event sequences increase: for instance if more radioactive
material can be released during an accident. This is the case when utilities are granted power
uprates. Indeed, highly enriched uranium is generally added, which increases the total core
inventory. In turn, societal risk goes up.
Utilities submit power uprates as license amendment requests. It must be proved that the plant
will remain safe, and that there are still adequate measures taken to protect the health and safety
of the public. However, the increase in societal risk is not taken into account quantitatively.
Power uprates are widely used by the industry: in July 2004, the USNRC had completed 101
power uprate reviews, resulting in a gain of approximately 4,000MWe.
V.E. Conclusion
At a national level, measuring societal risk and assessing its tolerability is highly complex.
Indeed, using nuclear technology entails both direct benefits (e.g. available energy) as well as
unquantifiable positive externalities (e.g. energy independence). There is no easy way to weight
these benefits against the existence of very low probability and high consequence events, able to
kill many. Risks at that level have been referred to as "societal concerns", and no quantitative
tools can easily help to decision-making. However, if we restrict the analysis to the risk for
people around a power plant, such tools exist and are already in use in countries such as the
Netherlands. However, one must keep in mind that part of the difficulty in implementing societal
risk requirements comes from the tremendous role played by public perception and its reluctance
to accept the possibility, even with very low probability, of high consequence events.
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Part VI. Overview of Quantitative tools to measure societal risk
Limiting societal risk is a complex issue. The USNRC has recently considered the use of F-C
curves, but on an individual event basis only. No goal limiting the societal consequences of
nuclear accidents and operation is included in the framework so far. Including such goal, as it is
done in the Netherlands by putting a limit on the total number of fatalities resulting from a
potential accident, is a possibility.
The risk curves that have been used for societal risk assessment have mostly referred to one type
of consequence, usually the total number of fatalities. These curves are called FN curves.
Extended measures have been proposed, but have never entered regulations. An overview of
different quantitative tools to assess societal risk is presented in the following paragraphs.
VI.A. FN curves
VI.A.1. Definition
An overview of quantitative risk measures of societal risk is provided in (Jonkman et al, 2003),
in which societal risk is assumed to be related to the number of fatalities. Among them are FN
curves, which display the probability of having N or more fatalities per year, as a function of N,
on a double logarithmic scale.
We have 1- FN (x) = P(N > x) = ffN (n)dn, where f, is the probability density function of the
number of fatalities per year, FN (x) is the cumulative distribution function of the number of
fatalities per year, and 1- FN (x) is the complementary cumulative distribution function
(probability of having x or more fatalities per year).
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Figure 19: Example of FN curves for different groups of activities in the Netherlands
(Source RIVM, 2001)
VIA.2. Different types of FN curves
A distinction must be made between:
* The FN curves that display historical records of accidents. They are built using historical
data;
* The FN curves that result from quantitative risk assessment. Those are the result of modeling.
For instance, a level 3 PRA would be needed in order to build such curve for a nuclear power
plant. In practice, FN curves are often a mix of historical / empirical data and modeling
(Evans, 2003).
* Finally, the FN criteria are the curves that are used to assess the tolerability of FN curves.
VI.A.3. Use of FN curves in the Netherlands
FN curves are in use in some European countries such as the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, for the purpose of societal risk management.
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The Netherlands is a small country, with an area slightly less than twice the size of New Jersey,
and a total population of around 16.5 million as of 2006 (CIA data, 2006). Compared to the
United States, the number of inhabitants per square kilometer is 15 times higher in the
Netherlands. Lack of space is a significant issue in this country, which could account partly for
their decision to use societal risk criteria. Major accidents in the 70's involving Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) stations focused the attention on risk assessment and reduction, and on the
need for national standards (Ale, 2005). The first document to introduce limit values for
individual and societal risk was issued in 1986 and focused on LPG accidents. The policy
framework was then integrated in the document "Dealing with risk" that accompanied the First
National Environmental Policy Plan in 1989. The individual and societal limits set were also to
be used for nuclear power plant policy.
In the Netherlands, probabilistic safety criteria and goals have been developed. The risk
management policy (Versteeg, 1992) adopted for potential hazardous industries explicitly refers
to the safety of each single individual in the vicinity of the plant and to the population as a whole
and consists of different steps. The first step consists of the identification of the hazards and risks
and the scenarios that lead to then. These scenarios are then quantified with probabilistic risk
assessments methods. A third step, called the "assessment step" consists of showing compliance
with criteria and objectives. Risk is reduced until an optimum level is reached, following the As
Low as Reasonably Practical (ALARP) principle. Finally, control is implemented to ensure that
risk is maintained at this optimum level.
The policy uses a three-region approach and distinguishes three risk-related regions: one where
acceptable activities lie, one where reduction of risk is necessary according to the ALARP
principle and a last region where risk is considered unacceptable. The first separation is a de
minimis value, the second the criterion itself, which is usually referred to as the VROM criterion.
For instance, for each source of activity, the upper bound of acceptable individual level of risk is
10 - /year, while the de minimis value is 10-8 . Between those two values, the ALARP principle is
applicable. For all hazardous sources or activities, the maximum acceptable level of risk is 10- .
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Regarding societal risk, a curve relating the exceedance frequency of N or more fatalities to the
number of fatalities is used at the plant level. No national societal goal has been proposed. Two
complementary cumulative density functions are used to determine the three regions. The lines
chosen are two straight lines with a slope -2 reflecting risk aversion.
The following figure gives a visualization of the FN criterion adopted in the Netherlands:
Figure 20: FN criteria in the Netherlands (note that only the upper curve is a criterion)
(Versteeg, 1992)
These criteria are on the number of fatalities outside the side boundary, therefore apply to
nuclear major accidents and do not apply to workers.
It is possible to compare the Dutch criterion with the Canvey Line criterion, defined by the
British Health and Safety Executive when it assessed in a milestone study in 1978-1981 the
potential of the industrial installations at Canvey Island on the Thames for causing a major
accident affecting the surrounding population (Ball and Floyd, 1998). The comparison of the two
criteria is presented on Figure 21:
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Figure 21: Comparison between Dutch and British risk tolerability criteria (the Canvey
Line criterion is risk-neutral, as opposed to the highly risk-averse Dutch criterion.)
VI.A.4. Dutch regulations and U.S. PRA results
Dutch FN curves are highly risk averse. Indeed, if we assess the tolerability of risk of certain
U.S. plants using the Dutch criterion, the results might be surprising: Figure 22 shows a risk
curve (which is similar to a FN curve) for the total number of early fatalities at a nuclear power
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Figure 22: Example of level-3 PRA results (NUREG-1150) and Dutch criterion
There are regions where the mean value risk curve is above the criterion, which is unacceptable
in the Dutch view. Furthermore, the assumptions between the Dutch and U.S. approaches are
very different. Indeed, such risk curve for NUREG-1150 was obtained making the assumption
that 99.5% of the population was evacuated; this assumption is not made in the Netherlands:
"In demonstrating compliance with the risk criteria, it is necessary to assume that
only the usual forms of mitigating measures are taken (i.e. action by fire services,
hospitals, etc.). Although special measures like evacuation, iodine prophylaxis and
sheltering may be taken by the Emergency Preparedness Organization, these are
disregarded in the analysis. In the Dutch view, it is unreasonable to assume that any
countermeasure will be 100% effective. On the contrary, it is more realistic to expect
that a substantial part of the population will be unable or unwilling to adopt the
prescribed countermeasure. The PSA results used to demonstrate compliance with
the risk criteria need, therefore, to reflect this more conservative assumption.
However, for the sake of interest, the PSA results of the Dutch nuclear power plants
show both situations: with and without credit being given for countermeasures."
(VROM, 2005)
However, there is today only one nuclear reactor in the Netherlands (PWR, 452 MWe).
If we don't consider the different assumptions, we can see that the result would have been very
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Figure 23: Example of level-3 PRA results (NUREG-1150) and risk-neutral criterion
With a slope equal to -1 and assuming that 99.5% of the population evacuates, the mean FN
curve lies below the criterion. This is also the case when the slope of the criterion line is set at










Figure 24: Example of level-3 PRA results (NUREG-1150) and risk-averse criterion (slope
equal to 1.2)
VI.A.5. Limits of FN curves
The use of FN curves as a decision-making tool has been criticized for the following reasons:
* FN curves correspond to a minimax decision rule. Therefore, they concentrate on extreme
features of statistical distribution, which can lead to decisions that appear unreasonable
(Evans and Verlander, 1997)
* As opposed to expected disutility functions, FN curves lead to "incoherent" judgment, in the
language of decision theory, when there is uncertainty associated with the accidents (Evans
and Verlander, 1997)
* FN curves are based solely on the number of fatalities. Decisions that use FN curves as a
risk-assessment tool overlook important consequences of accidents.
VI.B. Other risk assessment measures
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Other societal risk measures have been proposed for use, in an attempt to solve the issues
associated with FN curves previously identified.
For instance, FN curves do not allow the comparison of different systems, which could be
possible if a system could be represented by a single value, and not a curve. A simple measure of
societal risk can be expressed by the expected number of fatalities per year (Ale et al, 1996),
which is equal to the integral of the FN curve (Vrijling et al, 1997).
E(N) = xf, (x)dx =J(l- F, (u))du
0 0
Other measures also exist, that take into account risk-aversion. The aversion is taken into account
through a coefficient that gives more weight to accidents with a large number of fatalities. For
instance, the British Health and Safety Executive (HSE) defined a weighted risk integral
parameter called the Risk Integral as (Jonkman et al, 2003):
RICOMAH xafN (x)dx
0
Evans and Verlander propose another measure of societal risk: the expected disutility (Evans and
Verlander, 1997). According to the theory of decision-making under uncertainty, the tolerability
decisions must be made on the basis of expected utility to be consistent. The first step is to
associate a number u(n) as a measure of harm (u increases with n and has the same properties as
a utility function). It is assumed that the disutility function satisfies the axioms of the Expected
Utility Theory.
The disutility of an accident of uncertain size in the engineering system is given by:
ua =  u(n)p(n)
The choice of the disutility function can reflect risk-aversion (for instance, u(n) = nP with P, > 1).
Very few societal risk measures allow the consideration of consequences other than fatalities.
This possibility should thus be explored.
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VI.C. Extended measures of societal risk
VI.C.1. Would an extended definition of societal risk be more appropriate?
An extended definition of societal risk might be more appropriate depending on the technology
whose risk is studied. For instance, the risk metric used to assess the societal consequences of car
accidents in the U.S. measures the total number of prompt fatalities per year. It could include
injuries as well. Societal consequences of dam failure include among others: prompt fatalities,
evacuation costs, and off-site property damage. Each category of activity entails specific risks
and hence, specific risk assessment tools. It is therefore necessary to investigate the societal
consequences of nuclear accidents. A brief overview of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island
accidents is provided in the following paragraphs.
VI.C.1.a. Three Mile Island
The Three Mile Island accident in 1979, that involved a partial core meltdown of one reactor,
was the most serious nuclear incident in the United States commercial nuclear power plant
operating history. Detailed studies were conducted to assess the radiological consequences of the
accident by the USNRC, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health, the
Department of Energy and the State of Pennsylvania, as well by independent groups. No adverse
effects from radiation on human, animal and plant life could be directly correlated to the accident
(USNRC factsheet). However, it is important to note that 12,000 people were asked to evacuate
the area (families with pregnant women and preschool children living within 5 miles of the
facility), and an estimated 144,000 persons within 15 miles evacuated for a period averaging
between 4 and 5 days (Houts et al, 1988). Long term evacuation rates, i.e., people permanently
moving out of the area, were not affected by the crisis. Short term costs were much lower than
for natural disasters, because it involved no physical damage and consisted mainly of expenses
borne by families who evacuated, and loss of sale and production costs for businesses. There was
little evidence of the long-term economic impact on people living in the vicinity, for instance
regarding real-estate.
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During the crisis, there was an estimated 10% increase in the number of patients that reported
symptoms characteristic of mental patients, but after 18 months, it was no longer higher than in
the rest of the population studies.
The costs of cleaning up the damaged reactor were substantial. Public fear and distrust towards
nuclear power greatly increased.
VI.C.1.b. Chernobyl
The Chernobyl accident occurred in Ukraine in 1986 and is the most serious nuclear accident in
the history of commercial reactors worldwide. The consequences of the accident are still
imperfectly determined. However, Dr. El Baradei, IAEA Director General, has classified them in
three categories in a 2005 IAEA conference entitled "Chernobyl: Looking back to go forwards":
the physical impacts, in terms of health and environmental impacts, the psycho-social impacts on
the populations and the influence of the accident on the nuclear industry worldwide.
The following figures were cited in his speech:
* Among the emergency rescue workers at the scene of the accident, around 50 individuals
died either from acute radiation syndrome in 1986 or due to other radiation-related illnesses
in the year since.
* About 4000 children and adolescents contracted thyroid cancers from ingestion of
contaminated milk and other foods, and 9 of those children have died.
* Overall, based on statistical modeling of the radiation doses received by workers and local
residents, a total of 4000 deaths will eventually be attributable to the Chernobyl accident.
* Environmental fallout from the accident affected croplands, forests, rivers, fish and wildlife,
and urban centers. In the three countries more affected, nearly 800,000 hectares of
agricultural land was removed from service, and timber production was halted for nearly
700,000 hectares of forest.
* The psycho-social impacts were also devastating. Over 100,000 people were evacuated
immediately after the accident, and the total number of evacuees from severely contaminated
area eventually reached 350,000 people. While these resettlements helped to reduce the
collective dose of radiation, it was deeply traumatic for those involved. Studies have found
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that exposed population had anxiety levels twice as high as normal, with a greater incidence
of depression and stress symptoms.
As it is summarized by G. Saji (Saji, 2003), "As experienced in the Chernobyl accident, the
psychological consequences, as a category of health effects may well be the most significant at
the present time."
VI.C.1.c. The number of fatalities does not adequately capture societal
risk
What we can conclude from the review of these nuclear accidents, especially through the
example of Three Mile Island, is that societal consequences, and therefore societal risk, certainly
should capture more parameters than only fatalities, for instance psychological damage to the
population and land contamination.
The Dutch experience supports this conclusion (VROM, 2006). The country is currently
reconsidering its way of addressing societal risk. The fireworks disaster of Enschede in 2000 led
to an intensification of external safety policy and ambitious objectives were set out in the Dutch
Fourth National Environmental plan. Research is currently undertaken in order to improve the
framework used to limit societal risk. A full report will be submitted to the Lower House of the
Dutch Parliament in the summer 2006. One of the issues identified so far is the need to identify
the potential societal disruption of any prospective disaster, including injuries, damage to people,
actions taken by the emergency services and disaster response services.
VI.C.2. Societal risk measures accounting for more than fatalities
VI.C.2.a. Swiss proposal of risk measure
Literature on possible "extended" measures of societal risk is scarce. In order to quantify the
integrated impact of a scenario, there are mainly two possibilities: translate all consequences into
monetary values or transform all consequences into no-unit values
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Such approach was proposed in Switzerland. The federal ordinance on Protection against Major
Accidents (BUWAL, 1991) was issued in April 1991 in Switzerland with the objective of
protecting the public and the environment from major accidents. A new risk appraisal measure
was proposed, which used a F-C curve, with the consequence being the aggregate measure of 9
parameters summarized in the following table:
Indicator Description
Impact on NI Number of Early and latent fatalities
man, (Persons) fatalities
animals (persons)
and N2 Number of Serious and superficial injuries
ecosystem (Persons) injured
N3 Number of Persons evacuated for more than a year
(Persons) evacuees
N4 Alarm factor [Duration of stress x number of affected
(Persons) people]
N5 Number of dead Big animals.
(Animals) animals Small animals count for 1/100
Fish belongs to next category
Impact on N6 Area of
natural (sq. meters) damaged
resources ecosystem
N7 Area of Area that is no longer usable or inhabitable
(sq. meters) contaminated or that requires very expensive
soil decontamination treatment
N8 Area of polluted
(sq. meters) groundwater




Table 5: Categories defined in Swiss proposal
(Buwal, 1991)
The proposed regulation assumes that damage can be represented by these 9 parameters. Fewer
parameters might be selected, depending on the field of study. It is important to note that the
selection of the categories is subjective.
A quantitative risk analysis is done, and each scenario is assessed in terms of its impact on the
nine categories, as well as its frequency. Once the overall impact value of a scenario has been
determined from the individual impacts on each of the categories, the scenarios can be ordered in
terms of their consequences and complementary cumulative density function can be built. The
proposed CCDF expresses the probability of exceeding a certain consequence per site and per
year as a function of the overall impact.
A crucial question is how the different impacts should be combined in order to retain only one
consequence value for each scenario. A suitable impact scale is defined for each category of
indicator value, and then these individual impact values are combined to obtain the overall
impact value. Hence, the extended damage assessment asks two main questions:
* How can individual indicators be appraised?
* How can the individual indicators be combined into a single consequence value?
A methodology is presented in (Bohnenblust et al, 1994) that uses the Fuzzy Set theory.
If different scales are available in literature to define the significance of an event (Bohnenblust et
al, 1994), the Fuzzy Set theory uses a scale that ranges from 0 (normal operation) to 1
(catastrophe). If the impact value is over 1, it is then taken equal to 1. Figure 25 presents such
disaster scale:
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Normal Incident Severe Catastrophe
operation accident
Figure 25: Disaster scale
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El i
(Bohenblust et al, 1994)
The Fuzzy Set theory uses membership functions, which are functions that define how each point
in the input space is mapped to a membership value (or degree of membership) between 0 and 1.
In our case, if the function equals one for an element x, then x necessarily possesses a predefined
property. If the function equals zero, then it unequivocally does not possess the property. Finally,
an intermediate value indicates the degree of membership or the degree to which x possesses the
property.
Bohnenblust postulates a simple linear relationship between the logarithmic indicator value and
the impact value. The same approach can be found in the Swiss Ordinance. To determine the
function, the magnitude of the impact value 0.2 and 0.6 for each indicator is assessed
subjectively by experts. The functions are noted g, (Ni)
Figure 26 shows the relationship for fatalities (a total number of 4 fatalities is assigned an impact
value of 0.2, 100 fatalities correspond to a value 0.6):
Figure 26: Membership function for total number of fatalities
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The individual impact values must then be combined into a single impact value. The Swiss
regulatory proposal does not give a definite answer on this issue, and just states that the
maximum of all the indicators could be chosen as the overall impact value:
C = max{Ni }.
Bohnenblust proposes a function value:
fp, (NN 2 ,..., N) = min(l, (N +... (g (N 9 ))
where p is an integer parameter, derived from the Yager operator, and chosen equal to 5 by
Bohnenblust in order to lead to a value more significant than the max value and less important
than the sum of the individual impact values.
VI.C.2.b. Swiss criterion
Once a risk factor has been calculated, the acceptability of the risk must be addressed. The Swiss
proposal includes a three-region approach: a region where risk is unacceptable, a region where it
is acceptable and finally a region where risk must be reduced but in consideration of costs and
benefits. Figure 27 presents the F-C curve:
- 78 -
exceedance per site per year
Figure 27: F-C curve proposed by the Swiss Ordinance
(Buwal, 1991)
A single value figure can also be used to compare previous accidents with very different
consequences.
However, no consensus exists on the method in Switzerland and it is still discussed. One of the
major issues of the method is that it involves subjective judgments almost at every step
(definition of categories, translation of the consequences into individual impact values,
combination of individual values into an overall value, definition of acceptable level of risk).
VI.D. Conclusion
Use of FN curves in the Netherlands has had a positive impact on safety. It is however hard to
extrapolate these results to the United States since the two countries differ in geographical size,
population density and in their number of reactors. Furthermore, societal risk from nuclear










I - I I





experience from the Chernobyl accident shows that consequences such as land contamination
should also be included in any risk assessment tools aimed at limiting the societal risk from
nuclear accidents. If "extended" measures of societal risk have been proposed, not one has ever
been implemented. The Netherlands have announced their willingness to include such integrated
measure in their environmental regulations, but no further details are currently available. The
question of integrating such curve into the existing risk criteria in the U.S. has been recently
asked.
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Part VII. Should societal risk criteria be defined in the United States?
At least one member of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in the United
States has suggested establishing a F-C curve societal risk criterion for nuclear power plants, and
has proposed to use as a consequence the overall societal consequences as determined by the
total number of prompt fatalities, latent cancers, injuries, and land contamination (Kress, 2005).
The purpose of this part is to explore the question of societal risk criteria in the United States, to
analyze the proposal, as well as to propose variations on the criterion.
VII.A. Description of proposal
VII.A.1. Overview
The F-C curves suggested by Kress are an extension of the "classical" FN curves (Kress, 2005).
The ACRS member suggests using as a measure of consequence the overall societal cost as
determined by the total number of prompt fatalities, latent cancers, injuries, and land
contamination, all expressed in terms of dollars. For each of these four categories of
consequences, level-3 PRAs are already able to produce complementary cumulative density
functions (CCDF), with uncertainties accounted for, as illustrated in Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Complementary Cumulative Density Function for acute fatalities from Plant
"X" level-3 PRA
CCDF for all four categories of consequences can be translated into a dollar value and then
combined so as to obtain one curve capturing all consequences. Difficulties of such an approach
are highlighted in Part VII.C.2. The tolerability of risk can then be assessed by comparing the
curve to a criterion, such as the illustrative one proposed by Kress and reproduced in Figure 29.
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Figure 29: Illustrative Complementary Cumulative Density Function F-C risk acceptance
criteria (Kress, 2005)
Kress's choice of the F-C curve shape is justified by the following arguments:
Exactly like for FN curves, the area under the curve is equal to the expected cost in dollars
per site and per year for all the categories of consequences previously defined. The expected
cost, called "F-C cost-risk status", can be estimated for each plant, which allows the ranking
of different plants based on that figure. If the estimated F-C curve is below the F-C criterion,
then the area under the first is smaller than the area under the second. Hence, having a F-C
curve criterion limits the F-C cost-risk status. Kress proposes as an example to set the F-C
cost-risk status limit, i.e. the area under the curve, in a similar way used to define the QHOs:
If there are 100,000 accidents per year in the U.S. and approximately 100 plants, and if the
cost per death is taken equal to $ 2.5 million, then the limit per plant should be set at 0.1 % of
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future plants are expected to be safer, the area under the F-C curve is equal to one tenth of
this maximum cost-risk status, i.e. $ 2.5* 10'/site-yr
* As the consequences tend to 0, the CCDF tends to the value of the Core Damage Frequency
(or a preventive risk metric in the technology-neutral context). Therefore, the intersection of
the F-C curve and the y-axis is an estimate of the CDF, and must be below the value of the
intersection of the F-C criterion and the y-axis. Kress suggests using a value of the CDF limit
equal to 10-5 /site-yr; a value coherent with the one that has been recently proposed by the
USNRC (USNRC, 2006). Therefore, the asymptote of the curve at small consequences is
equal to 10- /site-yr.
* Finally, Kress chooses to define the F-C curve in a risk-neutral manner
The additional criteria implied by the F-C curves are illustrated on Figure 30.
Figure 30: Criteria implied by the F-C curve
Furthermore, in order to account for uncertainties in the PRA calculations, a three-region
approach has been proposed. Between the acceptable and the unacceptable regions, a cost-benefit
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improvement region can be defined. In that region, the costs and benefits of a change, all
expressed in dollars, must be weighted in order to decide if the proposed change is acceptable.
Each change is evaluated with regards to impact categories defined by the USNRC in the
Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook (USNRC, 1997).
VII.A.2. Application of proposal
In order to calculate on a real case the societal risk from different power plants, Kress suggests
using the results of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants (USNRC, 1996), detailed in Appendix 1.
VII.A.2.a. Overview of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement
for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants
The Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) examines wherever possible the
environmental impacts that could occur as a result of renewing licenses of individual nuclear
power plants. For that reason, it estimates the impact of postulated accidents and severe accidents
on health effects, captured by early and latent fatalities, and off-site costs for the middle year of
relicense (MYR) population for 74 power plants. The calculations are conservative, and no
discount rate is considered here.
The GEIS assumes that the license renewal process will ensure that aging effects are controlled,
i.e. that the probability of radioactive release from accidents will not increase over the license
extension period. Most of the risk is assumed to be captured by the population around the plant,
as well as the wind direction. This is a very restrictive assumption, which implies that societal
risk due to plant characteristics is not accounted for (see Part V.D.2).
The Exposure Index (EI) methodology is used in NUREG-1437. The El is a site-specific variable
reflecting the population surrounding the plant, weighted by the site-specific wind direction
frequency, which determines the fraction of population at risk
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The CRAC computer code is used to calculate off-site severe accident costs for the area
contaminated by the accident. The code estimates the evacuation costs, the value of crops
contaminated and condemned, the value of milk contaminated and condemned, the costs of
decontamination of property where practical, and the indirect costs resulting from the loss of use
of property and income.
VII.A.2.b. Results
This method does not allow the construction of F-C curves. However, it provides estimates for
the total number of early and latent fatalities as well as the off-site costs previously defined. To




Figure 31: F-C risk-cost status (Kress, 2005)
The results are the following: two plants have a significant higher F-C risk-cost status than the
others, with an F-C cost-risk status higher than 15 million dollar per reactor year. Two plants
have an F-C cost-risk status between 10 and 15 million dollars per reactor year. The 70
remaining plants are below 10 million dollars.
As seen earlier, Kress suggests requiring that the total societal cost from nuclear accidents be less
than 0.1 % of the total societal cost due to accidents in the U.S. , i.e. $ 2.5* 105 /site-yr for a value
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of life of 2.5 million dollars, and considering advanced plants will be ten times safer than current
plants.
There are many outliers with this criterion. However, even if no criterion is used, it is still
possible to observe a wide range of F-C cost-risk status and that the value is significantly higher
than the others for a few of them.
This risk measure relies on the value of statistical life chosen. It is thus necessary to evaluate the
dependence of the results on such value.
VII.B. Valuation of life is required in this approach
VII.B.1. USNRC policy regarding valuation of life
Defining the overall societal risk as the sum of the fatalities, injuries and land contamination
implies valuing explicitly human life, which is a controversial issue. The position of the USNRC
on that matter is stated in NUREG/BR-0184, which is the regulatory analysis technical
evaluation handbook (USNRC, 1997). For cost-benefit analyses, the USNRC recommends using
the monetary equivalent of $2000/person-rem for accidental and routine emissions, for both
public and occupational exposure, and taking into account all the accident-related health effects.
The mean cancer risk factor reported in the literature is 5x10-4/rem, and the range of
uncertainties is estimated to be 3x 10-49x 10-4 (Guenther and Thein, 1997). This cancer risk
factor value accounts for the fact that the young have an increased sensitivity to radiations, the
non-fatal cancers and the severe genetic effects.
The statistical value of life for latent fatalities entailed by the USNRC guideline is therefore
4,000,000 dollars and the range of uncertainties is $ 2,000,000 - $ 7,000,000. Based on this
uncertainty, the range of values used to assess the strength of the results is chosen equal to $
1,000,000 - $ 10,000,000.
Literature is scarce on how a latent fatality should be weighted in comparison to an early fatality.
A value for early fatality five times higher than the value for latent fatality has been used in a
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societal risk proposal (Okrent, 1981). However, no rationale for such figure is provided. We will
assume in the following calculations that the statistical value of life for an early fatality is at least
as high as that of a latent fatality.
One should note that new methods are being developed to replace the traditional concept of a
calculation based on the Value of Statistical Life with an evaluation of the Value of Life Year
Lost. This concept would be particularly useful to weight an early death against a latent death.
VII.B.2. Sensitivity analysis
Using NUREG-1437 data, it is possible to assess the importance of latent fatalities with regards
to early fatalities and to estimate the F-C cost-risk status for the 74 plants using different values
of statistical life. Each plant is defined by a number between I and 74.
VII.B.2.a. Latent fatalities dominate
The ratio of the predicted number of early fatalities by the predicted number of latent fatalities
can be calculated for each plant using NUREG-1437 data, as shown in Figure 32.
- 88-






::.;. ii+:i~ ~ _ .. " i : : : i : i- i: +iii+i-:: i+,+i +  :++i+:·i:':: ' , i: +~ Ji i i + + i:+  •:
:I: Ili::.:i+l ::: ::::  i : !i'li-+ii•+,•::,. .!+i!::,i::•...:+?  Ra+i. Eal/L tn
:i:!! .:+ .:+:j:ii 'ii:ii:i.++.i:, !.:!.:![:i.:::!.:•+
.,,;:liii~ii~ilii•:iili'i!'; :-l! •+!':•+'ii! 1Es .-iiB· ;:a•_io •a•,•]•a, eo,1i;:.i"li
0 20 40 60 80
Plant identified by number
Figure 32: Ratio of the predicted number of early fatalities to the predicted number of
latent fatalities
For 71 plants, this ratio is below 5%; for 2 plants, the ratio lies between 5 and 15%. Finally, for
only one plant is the ratio as high as 30%. Therefore, latent fatalities dominate early fatalities in
terms of absolute predicted numbers.
VII.B.2.b. Frequency-consequence cost-risk status
If we assume that a statistical value of life can be calculated (methods are presented in Appendix
2), the strength of F-C risk measure can be assessed by analyzing the dependence of the results
on the value of life chosen. Values ranging from $1,000,000 $ to $10,000,000 are chosen.
* Case 1: Value for early and latent fatality is $ 1,000,000
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Total cost in dollars (statistical values of early and latent fatality are respectively $
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Frequency-consequence cost-risk status - value for early and latent fatality is $
1,000,000
The three plants with the highest F-C cost-risk status are plants 30, 53 and 5, from the highest to
the lowest.
* Case 2: Value for early fatality is $2,500,000 and value for latent fatality is $1,000,000
Figure 34: Frequency-consequence cost-risk status - Value for early fatality is $2,500,000
and value for latent fatality is $1,000,000
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Figure 33:
Total cost in dollars (statistical values of early and latent fatality are respectively $
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The three plants with the highest F-C cost-risk status are plants 30, 53 and 5, from the highest to
the lowest.
* Case 3: Value for early fatality is $2,500,000 and value for latent fatality is $2,500,000
Figure 35: Frequency-consequence cost-risk status - Value for early fatality is $2,500,000
and value for latent fatality is $2,500,000
The three plants with the highest F-C cost-risk status are plants 30, 53 and 5, from the highest to
the lowest.
* Case 4: Value for early fatality is $4,000,000 and value for latent fatality is $4,000,000
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Total cost in dollars (statistical values of early and latent fatality are respectively $
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Figure 36: Frequency-consequence cost-risk status - Value for early fatality is $4,000,000
and value for latent fatality is $4,000,000
The three plants with the highest F-C cost-risk status are plants 30, 53 and 5, from the highest to
the lowest.
* Case 5: Value for early fatality is $12,500,000 and value for latent fatality is $2.5,000,000
Figure 37: Frequency-consequence cost-risk status - Value for early fatality is $12,500,000
and value for latent fatality is $2,500,000
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Total cost in dollars (statistical values of early and latent fatality are respectively $
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The three plants with the highest F-C cost-risk status are plants 30, 53 and 5, from the highest to
the lowest.
Case 6: Value for early fatality is $20,000,000 and value for latent fatality is $4,000,000
Total cost in dollars (statistical values of early and latent fatality are respectively $
20,000,000 and $ 4,000,000)
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Figure 38: Frequency-consequence cost-risk status - Value for early fatality is $20,000,000
and value for latent fatality is $4,000,000
The three plants with the highest F-C cost-risk status are plants 30, 53 and 5, from the highest to
the lowest.
VII.B.3. Summary of results and implications
The previous results are summarized in Table 6:
Value of life (latent
Value of life (early fatality) Plants with highest F-C
Case fatality)
In million dollars risk-cost status
In million dollars
1 1 1 30, 53,5 (in order)





!.5 2.5 30, 53,5 (in order)
4 4 30, 53,5 (in order)
2.5 2.5 30, 53,5 (in order)
20 4 30, 53,5 (in order)
Table 6: Ranking of plants based on their overall societal cost for different values of
statistical life
* In light of the results, it appears that no matter the statistical values of life chosen for early
and latent fatalities, there are always 3 plants whose F-C cost-risk status is significantly higher
than those of the remaining 71 plants. Since the effects of plant aging were not accounted for in
the calculations, we can conclude that most of the risk comes from an increased number of
people living around the plant, as well as an increase of the off-site costs of accidents (for
instance increase in the price of land, crop values, or real estate). The ratio between the costs due
to fatalities, both early and latent, and off-site costs, depends of course on the value of life
chosen. The following figure presents the calculation of the ratio (Off-site costs in
dollars)/(Predicted early and fatality costs for statistical values of early and latent fatalities
respectively equal to $12,500,000 and $2,500,000).
Figure 39: Comparison between off-site costs and fatality-related predicted costs (statistical
values of early and latent fatalities respectively equal to $12,500,000 and $2,500,000)
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For the majority of cases, the off-site costs represent around 20% of the fatality-related costs.
This ratio decreases if higher statistical values of life are chosen. Therefore, costs due to latent
fatalities dominate the overall predicted societal cost.
* The criterion proposed by Kress (when not divided by 10 to account for the fact that the
plants considered in NUREG-1437 are current plants, and not advanced plants) shows a large
number of outliers. Following up on Kress's idea, we can build a criterion similarly to what has
been done with the QHOs: There are approximately 100,000 accidental deaths in the U.S. per
year, and most of these deaths are early fatalities. The criterion should therefore be calculated
using the statistical value of life for early fatality.
In the case where we valued an early life to be equal to 12.5 million dollars and a latent fatality
to 2.5 million dollars, the criterion becomes:
(0.001)*(12.5*106)*(1*105)/(100)= $ 12.5*10 6 /site-yr.
As illustrated on Figure 40, there are only three unambiguous outliers using this criterion:
Figure 40: Assessment of the tolerability of F-C cost risk status using statistical values of
early and latent fatalities respectively equal to $12,500,000 and $2,500,000
The same can be done for a statistical value of early fatality equal to $20,000,000 and a value of
latent fatality equal to 4,000,000.
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The criterion becomes: (0.001)*(20* 106 )*(1 * 10 )/(100)= $ 20*10 6 /site -yr, and the tolerability
of societal risk in that case is illustrated on Figure 41.
Total cost in dollars (statistical ~iues of early and latent fatality are respectiely $







# 4 ~ --%,:
i I
Figure 41: Assessment of the tolerability of F-C cost risk status using statistical values of
early and latent fatalities respectively equal to $20,000,000 and $4,000,000
* The previous calculations show that societal risk is unequally distributed in the U.S., since
some plants involve a much higher societal cost than others. This could be used by regulatory
authorities as a screening criterion: outlying plants should be scrutinized in special cases, for
instance when licensees require power uprates.
VII.C. Issued related to the approach
VII.C.1. Valuation of injuries
Kress proposes to define the societal cost of nuclear accidents as the sum of the costs of early
fatalities, latent fatalities, land contamination and injuries. If there is available literature on the
valuation of life, be it to support it or to criticize it (Heinzerling et al, 2002), data on valuation of
injuries is very scarce; which makes it difficult to include injuries in the measure.
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VII.C.2. Correlation of variables
The consequences "early fatalities", "latent fatalities", "land contamination" and "injuries" can
be treated as random variables. For each of them, it is possible to obtain a complementary
cumulative density function as an output of a level-3 PRA. To obtain a monetary equivalent for
early and latent fatalities, one can easily multiply the consequence axis by the statistical value of
life. However, building an aggregated risk curve for all the consequences requires the knowledge
of the correlation between the different random variables. For instance, the more people are
evacuated (cost taken into account in the off-site cost category or land contamination), the lower
are the health effects (the cost of early/latent fatalities decreases). Estimate of these correlations
requires additional burdensome and uncertain calculations. This hasn't been done up to date.
VII.C.3. Maturity of computer codes
Computer codes such as Melcor Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) used for level
3-PRAs produce risk curves for, among other consequences, early fatalities, cancers, injuries,
collective dose, and offsite property damage. The epistemic uncertainties are very high,
especially for the first three items, as illustrated on figure 42:
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Figure 42: High uncertainties for Plant "X" level-3 PRA output
Decision-making with such uncertainties is highly complex, and tools must be improved. A
group of experts of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) recommended in 2000 that accident
consequence assessment codes be further developed (NEA, 2000).
VII.CA. Siting vs Design
Implementing a societal risk criterion is complex because it requires both the knowledge of
precise details on the site where the plant is located (e.g. wind direction, density and location of
population, evacuation resources) and the plant characteristics. For that reason, it is very unlikely
that such criterion could be part of the licensing process, since the designer has little knowledge
of the site where the plant will be located.
The following figure details what data is necessary depending on the definition of the F-C curve.
The consequence chosen by Farmer in 1967 was the amount of Iodine 131 released. This
consequence measure did not require knowledge of the site. The F-C curve developed by the





distance from the site as a consequence measure. Only weather data or models are needed to
calculate this consequence. This is not the case for the F-C societal risk criterion which requires
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Figure 43: Required data depending on the type of frequency-consequence curve
VII.D. Conclusion
A societal risk criterion defined in the form of a F-C curve would be a useful way to control the
risk of current reactors. Indeed, the fleet of reactors displays a wide range of F-C cost-risk
statuses and certain plants should be closely scrutinized, for instance when they request power
uprates. However, changing the regulations now for current plants would be acknowledging that
the point has been missed for decades. Kress suggests using such curves for advanced reactors.
Several objections can be made to this suggestion: first, the use of such criterion requires the
knowledge of both the site (for instance population and weather) and plant characteristics at the
time of licensing; which is often not the case. Second, advanced plants are expected to be so safe
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that such criterion may not be needed. A new evaluation of the need for such criterion should be
done when data on level-3 PRAs of Generation IV reactors becomes available.
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Part VIII. Summary of conclusions
The licensing of nuclear power plants has focused until now on Light Water Reactors and has not
incorporated systematically insights and benefits from PRA. With the goal of making the
licensing process more efficient, predictable and stable for advanced reactors, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has recently drafted a risk-informed and technology-neutral framework
for new plant licensing. The Commission expects that advanced nuclear power plants will show
enhanced margins of safety, and that advanced reactor designs will comply with the
Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement. In order to meet these expectations, PRA tools are
currently being considered; among them are frequency-consequence curves, which plot the
frequency of having C or more consequences (fatalities, injuries, dollars, dose...) against the
consequences C. The objective of this thesis is to study their role and usefulness in the context of
the new NRC framework, as well as to explore their potential application as a societal risk
acceptance criterion.
In parts II, III and IV, we have presented and analyzed F-C curves, as defined by the USNRC,
and concluded that such risk assessment tools contributed effectively to the definition of a risk-
informed licensing process, for they allowed, among other changes, the implementation of
structuralist and rationalist Defense-in-Depth. Furthermore, the use of F-C curves introduces a
major change in the regulations by defining a systematic selection process of Licensing Basis
Events, intended to replace the fully deterministic Design-Basis Accidents.
The USNRC's use of F-C curves is based on individual risk and is therefore quite innovative,
since these tools are classically used to assess societal risk.
In part IV and V, we introduced the general concept of societal risk and the quantitative tools
available to assess and limit such risk. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows:
e Existing tools concentrate on a single type of consequence, in general early fatalities, and are
known as FN curves. Those curves have entered the regulations in the Netherlands, and have had
a positive impact on safety. It is however hard to extrapolate these results to the United States
since the two countries differ in geographical size, population density and in their number of
reactors.
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* An overview of nuclear accidents shows that societal risk from nuclear accidents should
capture more than fatalities as a unique category of consequences. Among other categories, any
risk measure specific to the nuclear field should include latent fatalities and land contamination.
If "extended" measures of societal risk have been proposed, not one has ever been implemented.
The question of integrating such curve into the existing risk criteria in the U.S. has been recently
raised.
Finally, after a review in Part VII of the latest proposal to include an extended societal risk
criterion in the U.S., we concluded that:
* Societal risk is affected by the siting of the nuclear power plant and the amount of radioactive
material present in the core, and not by the design of the reactor. Changing design to suit the site
defeats the purpose of standardization and the public would want all sites to have the best
available design.
* Current plants involve a wide range of societal costs, and certain costs were deemed
unacceptable when compared to the criteria we defined.
* Plants that are considered as outliers in our model should be closely scrutinized when
requesting power uprates, likely to increase the amount of radioactive material in the core.
* In light of the available data, societal risk criteria are not needed for future plants. A new
evaluation of the need for such criteria should be done when data on level-3 PRAs of Generation
IV reactors becomes available.
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Appendix 1: Overview of NUREG-1437
Background
Operating licenses of nuclear power plants may be renewed for up to 20 years beyond the 40-
year term of the initial license. Such renewal is authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
and the renewal process examines if the plant can continue to operate safety during the extension
period. Limiting the initial operating license to 40 years was justified for economic and antitrust
considerations. The first operating license will expire in 2009, and 40 % of the operating licenses
will expire by 2015. In 1991, the USNRC published safety requirements for license renewal as
10 CFR Part 54. This first license renewal rule was amended in 1995. The operator that wishes to
renew its license must submit a report that identifies the systems, structures and components that
would be affected by the license renewal, shows that the effect of aging are well managed; and
finally analyzes the environmental impact of the renewal (the scope of the environmental review is
codified in 10 CFR 51). Independent reviews by the USNRC and the ACRS are carried out.
The Generic Environmental Impact Statement
The Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) examines wherever possible the
environmental impacts that could occur as a result of renewing licenses of individual nuclear
power plants. The GEIS was undertaken to provide the technical basis for an amendment to the
10 CFR Part 51, "Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related
Regulatory Functions," with regard to the renewal of nuclear power plant operating licenses.
Assumptions
On a high-level, the increase in risk during the renewal period can be due to either deterioration
of the plant safety itself due to aging phenomena for instance; or in the change in the
environment around the plant (e.g. increase in the density around the plant). The GEIS assumes
that the license renewal process will ensure that aging effects are controlled, i.e. that the
probability of radioactive release from accidents will not increase over the license extension
period. Most of the risk is assumed to be captured by the population around the plant, as well as
by the wind direction.
Methodology for predicting risk
Both the risks from design-basis accidents and severe accidents are evaluated in the GEIS. Doses
and the resulting health effects, captured by early and latent fatalities, are estimated for the
middle year of relicense (MYR) population, defined as the "estimated midpoint of the renewal
period for a given plant rounded upward to the next year of available population data".
The Exposure Index (EI) methodology was used. The El is a site-specific variable reflecting the
population surrounding the plant, weighted by the site-specific wind direction frequency, which
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determines the fraction of population at risk. The total risk value of each plant, available from
existing FES analyses, was regressed against the El for that plant; and average and 95 percent
upper confidence bound values of total risk were estimated.
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Appendix 2: Valuation of life
Valuing life is a controversial issue, and the estimated values of life vary considerably from one
study to another, depending on the way they are calculated. Two approaches have traditionally
been used (Viscusi et al, 2000): the first approach estimates the implicit prices for the social risk
commodities that may be traded on markets (for instance, workers are willing to accept higher
wages for jobs that carry higher risks). The second consists in polling people and ask them how
much they value a health outcome. This approach is referred to as the "Willingness to Pay"
approach. It is important to remind here that the estimated values are statistical values of life:
they do not refer to a specific individual, but rather as the cost to reduce the average number of
deaths by one.
Valuing life is needed for certain cost-benefit analyses when health impacts of a regulation have
to be monetized. There are many opponents to the use of cost benefit analysis in the
environmental regulations, arguing that not only is it impossible to value life but it can also lead
to unreasonable results (for instance, smoking should be encouraged based on a cost-benefit
analysis since people are expected to die younger and therefore the cost of their retirement on
society decreases) (Heinzerling et al, 2000).
In 1997, the USNRC released a document designed to provide guidance for cost-benefit analysis
(USNRC, 1997). In that document, the Commission recommended the use of the value
$2000/per person-rem averted for both public and occupational exposure, to account for all
health effects (and not land contamination). This value was to be used for both routine and
accidental exposure. In a paper summarizing a work performed under contract for the U.S.
Department of Energy in 1995, Guenther and Thein used a two-fold approach: after estimating
the value of statistical life (in dollars), an evaluation of the probability of cancer death due to
radiation exposure of some given amount (death per person-Sv) was carried out. The product of
both results produced a value per person-Sv. The methods illustrated in the paper are the
following:
* The analysis of jury awards and settlements from wrongful death suits reflects society's
valuation of life thanks to a randomly selected jury. The following table provides a summary of
the main assumptions of this method.
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Approach: Lawsuit of wrongful deaths
Table 7: Valuation of life: Lawsuit of wrongful deaths
* Another approach is the study of medical expenditures, which consists in the evaluation of
the amount of money "the individual is willing to spend to save or prolong the life of an
individual suffering from a debilitating illness". The study carried out chose to analyze cancer.
* The analysis of insurance coverage is a third possible method, and assumes that the value
individuals place on their own lives is reflected by the amount of coverage they purchase.
* The fourth study carried out consisted in analyzing individual wages and investments, which
reflect an individual's contribution to society. This approach is very similar to the Human
Capital approach.
Finally, the authors performed a literature search for values of life. The results of the various
calculation approaches are summarized in Table 8.
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Method Advantages fAssumptions Observations
Examination of jury- In the case of As juries are When the jury
awards and settlements awards, all randomly specified the
in wrongful deaths suits aspects (e.g. pain selected, their remaining years of
(Otway, 1971; Miller, and suffering, decisions life, the average
1989) from 1989 to loss of service, "represent a annualized awards
1993 (the time value of wrongful deaths consensus of was 2 to 4 times
money is not taken into and punitive society's higher than the
account) damage) of the values" calculated average of
award reflect the all the cases
Distinction between economic impact The value
wrongful deaths of the loss of life awarded reflects There was a small
involving malpractice the value of life number of large
and wrongful deaths remaining. settlements, which
involving product skewed the average
liability above the median
Method used to ascertain a value of life Range in values (1990 Recommended
U.S. dollars) values (1990
U.S. dollars)
Jury award from wrongful death suits 562,000 - 12,760,000 3,454,000
Medical expenditures 141,000 - 4,222,000 4,222,000
Life insurance coverage 130,700 - 3,356,000 3,356,000
Lifetime wages and investments 960,000 - 2,670,000 2,670,000
Review of literature
500 life-saving interventions 1,297,999 - 191,000,000 2,865,000
Willingness To Pay approach 83,000 - 18,400,000 2,844,000
Human-Capital Approach 210,000 - 1,124,000 558,000
Values used by federal government 2,000,000 - 300,000,000 2,500,000
Law Enforcement 3,017,000
AVERAGE 672,000 - 7,089,000 3,116,000
Table 8: Methods for valuating life
The paper concludes that since the average value of life has been calculated to be $3,116,000; a
"conservative" value is $4,000,000 (1990 dollars). The methodologies do not make a difference
between early and latent fatalities: for instance, wrongful deaths can be both early and latent.
Literature is scarce on how a latent fatality should be weighted in comparison to an early fatality.
A value for early fatality five times higher than the value for latent fatality has been used in a
societal risk proposal (Okrent, 1981). However, no rationale for such figure is provided. It is
reasonable to assume that the statistical value of life for an early fatality is at least as high as that
of a latent fatality.
The use of cancer risk factor estimates allow the calculation of the value of a latent fatality:
Guenther and Thein estimate the cancer risk factor to be 0.052 Sv^- 1; with a range of uncertainty
being 0.03 to 0.09 SVA- 1. This cancer risk factor value accounts for the fact that the young have
an increased sensitivity to radiations, the non-fatal cancers and the severe genetic effects
The value of life has been previously chosen to be equal to 4,000,000 dollars. If the cancer risk
factor is estimated to be equal to approximately 0.05 Sv-1; the cost per person-rem is $2000.
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